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INTRODUCTION
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
IN LATIN AMERICA

The number of Latin American players in Major League Baseball has
increased dramatically from 1980 to 2015. While an average of only five Latin
Americans per year played during the first half of the twentieth century, the
integration of Major League Baseball in 1947 increased recruiting in Latin
America. A series of labor disputes resulting in soaring salaries made Latin
American players, who were paid much less, increasingly desirable. By the late
1990’s one quarter of all Major League Baseball (MLB) players were foreign
born. 1 Almost all of these players were Latin Americans, and no country has
contributed more professional baseball players than the Dominican Republic. 2
Author Rob Ruck wrote, in 1998, that “almost a tenth of all major league players
come from this nation of eight million people. Only California, with over four
times the population, sends more of its sons to the majors.” 3 Baseball’s labor
evolution has changed how teams scout, sign and develop players. This thesis will
1

Marcos Breton and Jose Luis Villegas, Away Games, The Life and Times of a Latin Baseball
Player (N.Y., N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 36.
2
Latin America refers to 21 nations south of the U.S.border where French, Portuguese and
Spanish are spoken (Latin-based languages). Seven are part of North America (Mexico and
Central America, four are located in the Caribbean Sea (Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic and
Puerto Rico) and the remainder in South America. In both the Caribbean and South America,
those nations which speak English or Dutch are usually excluded. However, this paper mentions
MLB baseball players from four countries in the American hemisphere where Romance languages
are not the official language. They include, Belize (English), the Virgin Islands (English), Aruba
(Dutch) and Curacao (Dutch).
3
Rob Ruck, The Tropic of Baseball, Baseball in the Dominican Republic (Lincoln, NE: University
of Nebraska Press, 1991), 196.

1

examine the historical relationship between MLB and Latin America, and how
economic factors have increased the importance of acquiring international
talent— in particular, players from the Dominican Republic.
With MLB’s high percentage of active Latin players, many historians have
written about the origins of the connection between Latin America and MLB. 4
The pioneer teams and players are important, but there is scant historiography on
how and when MLB began signing Latin American players in large numbers. The
evolution of the international signing system, specifically in the Dominican
Republic, has been underestimated by historians. Over the last one hundred years,
thousands of Latin American players have played in the American major leagues.
This work will focus on the MLB economic and labor changes throughout history,
its effects on players, and specifically, recent Latin American signings between
1980 and 2015, emphasizing the Dominican Republic.
The history of Latin American baseball players and MLB parallels
American Civil Rights history. Most literature about the first Latin American
players describes racial prejudice. Writers such as Peter Bjarkman, Rob Ruck,
Adrian Burgos and Samuel Regalado have written about the Latin experience as
similar to the African-American experience (and many Latin Americans are of
African descent). Both African-American and Latin players were overlooked by
owners, other players, fans and writers in their time due to prejudice. Examining
the success and important contributions of baseball pioneers, like the first African
Americans or Latin American players, is important because it educates the

4

Throughout the text, Latin American may be shortened to Latin or Latino. This term is
specifically referencing foreign born-Latin American baseball players.

2

common fan about their professional accomplishments, albeit after their playing
days have finished. These biographical portraits however, can make one feel as
though discrimination was ended. It has not. It has evolved. Today’s catch phrase,
“business model,” disguises exploitation by using cost analysis to justify
unfairness. This could easily be called post-colonialism, a term used to refer to
Europeans’ arrogance when dealing with their former colonies. Institutional
racism might have ended for MLB players, but for foreign, Latin American
players the legacy of the color barrier left behind a residue of inequity: unequal
pay for equal work.
The origins, experiences, and history of the first and most successful Latin
American MLB players have been well documented by historians over the past
half century. One of the most prolific writers on the subject is Samuel Regalado,
with numerous articles, essays, and a book on Latin American ballplayers’
experiences. His Viva Baseball! is a chronological overview of the history of
Latin American professional baseball in the United States. 5 Regalado presents
extensive background and provides vivid accounts of the earliest players’
experiences, but focuses on the personal struggles faced by the players during
their transition. The obstacles many foreign players faced in MLB, and their
experiences in sports’ civil rights, have been proven and are important, but the
same focus and scholarship needs to be given to the economic inequalities
between ballplayers. African Americans faced some of the same racial and
societal challenges when they broke the color line and were integrated into the

5

Samuel O. Regalado, Viva Baseball! Latin Major Leaguers and Their Special Hunger (Chicago:
Univ. of Illinois Press, 1998).

3

majors, but they did not have the same experience in recruitment and the
negotiation of contracts that affected Latin Americans throughout the last half of
the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Regalado also has
written articles that examine MLB’s complex relationship with Latin American
players. I agree with Regalado’s globalization argument about baseball
production: MLB is similar to other global companies in that it produces
entertainment with cheap overseas labor and sells it at full retail in the United
States.
Author Alan Klein is part of a more radical school of thinking. 6 Klein,
whose work, beginning in the mid-1980s, describes the current MLB team
academy system, the role of Dominican scouts, the issues with foreign players and
offers policy recommendations to improve the current system. He concludes that
MLB exploited the Dominican Republic, in a neocolonial model. Authors Arturo
Marcano Guevara and David Fidler agree and chronicle MLB exploitation
through the process of globalization, player recruitment and development in
foreign markets. 7 These authors lay out how MLB operates in the Dominican
Republic. This paper will also add to the scholarship by examining the most
recent history (1995-2015), Latin American signings, the history of MLB labor
and its relation to the Latin American player’s market.
A counterargument to Klein, Guevara and Fidler’s exploitation thesis, is
what can be called the opportunity thesis. The opportunity thesis asserts that MLB

6

Alan M. Klein, Dominican Baseball: New Pride, Old Prejudice (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 2014), 19.
7
David P. Fidler and Arturo J. Marcano Guevara. Stealing Lives; The Globalization of Baseball
and the Tragic Story of Alexis Quiroz. (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2002).

4

offers foreign-born players an opportunity to escape poverty. This can also be
called economic relativism. Joe Cambria, formerly an international scout for the
Washington Senators and the foremost pioneer in Latin American scouting in the
early twentieth century, summed up MLB scouts’ opinions on signing, “I don’t
believe in bonuses, I open the door to opportunity for ball players.” 8 Another
example of MLB’s attitude towards Latin American players is the Detroit Tigers,
who in 1949 offered Alfonso Carrasquel a baseball glove and a plane ticket to the
United States as his bonus. 9 Rene Gayo, Director of Latin American scouting
operations for the Pittsburgh Pirates put it more bluntly, “These guys, if they
don’t play in the big leagues they’re going to end up selling mangoes in the
street.” 10 Gayo argues that MLB teams can pay Dominicans less than other
American players simply because they are happy to accept less money.
Alan Klein and other authors argue that economic relativism and the
opportunity thesis are flawed, exploitative rationalizations furthered by major
league teams who want to spend as little as possible on players’ salaries. MLB has
a business interest to keep salaries as low as possible; this reality supersedes the
Dominican players’ access to a free market. The poverty on the island gives MLB
an overwhelming negotiating advantage. This neocolonialism has been written
about by Klein and Regalado, among others, and this thesis explores what may
have changed now that Lain American players constitute a quarter of all MLB
players.

8

Adrian Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2007), 230.
9
Fidler and Guevara, Stealing Lives, 37.
10
Ibid, 49.

5

Similarly, there are authors who expand the argument that MLB is taking
advantage of cheap foreign labor. Published in 2002, Stealing Lives, describes an
extreme account of MLB’s Latin American signing and training system using a
Venezuelan player, Alexis Quiroz, as a case study. Fidler and Guevara quote the
Chicago Cubs minor league director at the time, David Wilder, who admitted to
the Chicago Tribune "It's a Third World country, and that's the way [the clubs]
treated it." 11 Using Quiroz and the Cubs as an example, the authors express
concern for Dominican child labor, discrimination, and human rights. They
explain that though there are international treaties to protect children from labor
exploitation and abuse, they generally do not apply to multinational corporations,
like MLB. One example is the reformed Venezuelan labor laws under Hugo
Chavez. The authors then describe the social and economic differences between
Latin players and American players, which create “double standards” and
ultimately “indirect and covert” discrimination against Latinos. 12 Considering
Fidler and Guevara’s work was published in 2002, follow up scholarship is
needed to see what changes and improvements teams have made. Dominican
players are treated better today than in the past, and MLB investments in the
Dominican academy system have been substantial. For example, the San Diego
Padres in 2008 opened up an $8 million, 15-acre academy complete with:
Two full fields and a half field, indoor batting cages and covered
pitching mounds, plus a weight room. There's a dormitory for the
players, separate quarters for the coaching staff, a dining hall and a

11

Gary Marx, “Cubs odyssey was bad trip, he claims, Alexis Quiroz says conditions in the
Dominican Republic were substandard” Chicago Tribune, June 29, 2003, http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/2003-06-29/sports/0306290354_1_dominican-republic-cubs-officials-cubs-director.
12
Fidler and Guevara, Stealing Lives, 175.
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classroom with computers to help players continue their education,
particularly in learning English. 13
Still the economic divide in players’ signing bonuses has persisted. Dollars being
invested by MLB and paid to Dominican players have both unquestionably risen
in the last thirty years, but not at a rate comparable to other players.
Recent developments in player recruitment, signing bonuses, and
academies since the year 2000 make it necessary to update scholarship. This
thesis expands upon Klein’s argument by examining specific events that led to a
dramatic increase in the number of Dominican players signing. It will emphasize
the history of the market for Latin American players as opposed to individual
player’s stories, as well as the origins of Latin Americans in MLB, the teams that
signed them, and the development of academies for younger players. Extra
attention will be given to the beginnings and evolution of the academy system,
because this innovation not only is what triggered increased Latin American
recruitment but also improved foreign player’s preparation and development.
Also, this work examines increased regulation in accordance with findings by
scholars such as Samuel Regalado, Jeffrey Storms, and David P. Fidler and
Arturo J. Marcano Guevara. These authors have discussed the issue of signing
minors. The issue of the exploitation of foreign talent by MLB, neocolonial
globalization, and regulation for signing minors is included.
MLB teams are businesses and the cost savings due to lower foreign
player salaries (along with player success) convinced an increasing number of

13

Bernie Wilson, “Padres officially open Dominican Republic baseball academy” USA Today,
April 29, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2008-04-29-2778253130_x.htm.

7

teams to follow this strategy. Since signing bonuses for foreign players remained
consistently low compared to North American players, every MLB team began to
scout and sign Latin American players. However, the practice has resulted in
problems and criticism, especially with regard to the Dominican Republic.
Competition, increased revenues, and journalistic scrutiny since the year 2000,
predicated management reform in operations, increased investment in
infrastructure and higher signing bonuses.
Part of the reason there is such a high number (27%) of international
players in the game today is their historic wage gap compared to North American
players. Roberto Clemente, of Puerto Rico, signed with the Dodgers in 1954 for a
signing bonus of $10,000. 14 In the mid-1990s, Miguel Tejada, of the Dominican
Republic, signed with the Oakland Athletics for $2,000. 15 Low salaries for Latin
American players is one of the reasons that MLB teams recruit them. The
twentieth century wage gap is real and helped create the neocolonial market and
system.
Another argument, put forward from a legal perspective, is that the
infrastructure today to develop elite baseball talent has affected teams’ investment
decisions. Stephen F. Ross and Michael James, Jr recently published an article
entitled, “A Strategic Legal Challenge to the Unforeseen Anticompetitive and
Racially Discriminatory Effects of Baseball’s North American Draft.” They
contend that the creation of the amateur draft changed player development for
14

David Schoenfield, “How the Pirates Stole Roberto Clemente from the Dodgers,” September 17,
2015. http://espn.go.com/blog/sweetspot/post/_/id/62869/how-the-pirates-stole-roberto-clementefrom-the-dodgers
15
Nicholas Dawidoff, “The Dominican National Pastime,” New York Times, May 30, 1999.
http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/05/30/reviews/990530.30dawidt.html

8

MLB teams and its consequences have been the diminishment of African
American (U.S. born) player participation and subsequently the rise of Latin
American players because of this investment shift. 16 I agree with their argument,
but will expand on the history of Latin American academies and discuss how the
signing of players has affected MLB labor history.
Chapter one will outline the history of baseball in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the
Dominican Republic and Mexico. Chapter two will examine the history of MLB
scouting, signing and the introduction of the academy system in foreign countries
will be explained. Chapter three will discuss labor relations, team revenue,
salaries, the advent and effect of the amateur draft and free agency. Chapter four
deals with recent changes in foreign academies, signing bonuses, and player
recruitment. Chapter five will offer conclusions and projections for the future of
MLB and foreign player development. The focus will be on players from the
Dominican Republic because they are the largest player producing foreign
country, but the larger focus is all foreign Latin American players since they
constitute such a large percentage of MLB players.

16

Stephen F. Ross and Michael James, Jr., “A Strategic Legal Challenge to the Unforeseen
Anticompetitive and Racially Discriminatory Effects of Baseball’s North American Draft,”
Columbia Law Review Sidebar, October, 2015, 2.

9

CHAPTER ONE
BRIEF LATIN AMERICAN
BASEBALL HISTORY

Baseball was first introduced to Latin America in the mid-nineteenth
century and was played there during the last quarter of that century. By 1900,
baseball was being played in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Canada, China,
Japan, and Mexico. The Dominican Republic. Venezuela, Panama, Brazil and
Korea began playing by the 1920s. Between 1900 and 1950 only 53 foreign
players played for major league teams. 17 Of these, the great majority (81%) came
from Cuba (See Map 1). For the first half of the twentieth century, the influx was
limited both by custom and law. In the south especially, the custom of segregation
limited the integration of dark-skinned players from Latin America. Even so,
baseball became increasingly popular in neighboring Latin America (See
Appendix 3 for a hemispheric chronology).

17

Peter C. Bjarkman, Baseball with a Latin Beat; A History of the Latin American Game
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., 1994).

10

Cuba
Cuba was the first Latin American country to play baseball. Nemesio
Guilott, a Cuban student returning from the United States, is credited with
introducing baseball on the island in 1864.

18

The first professional Latin baseball

player in the United States was Cuban born Esteban Bellan. Bellan made his
debut in 1868 for the Troy Haymakers, a New York team in the National
Association. 19 Baseball in Cuba flourished and two Cuban brothers, the Alomas,
brought the game to the Dominican Republic in 1891. 20 Cuban teams were so
skilled that they routinely beat major-league American teams when they visited
Cuba on barnstorming tours. 21

Map 1: MLB Players by Country of Origin 1900-1950
Source: Viva Baseball! Latin American Major Leaguers and Their Special Hunger,
Samuel O. Regalado

18

Regalado, Viva Baseball, 10.
Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 18.
20
Alan M. Klein, Sugarball: The American Game, the Dominican Dream, (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1993), 16.
21
Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 89.
19

11

In 1910 the American League champion Philadelphia Athletics, who had won 102
of 154 games that year, lost six out of ten matchups against Cuban teams. 22
These results surprised both Cubans and Americans. The competiveness of the
Cuban teams against their major league opponents made it clear that there was
major-league level talent in Cuba.
Racial issues blocked many Cubans from coming to the United States and
playing in the major leagues. At the turn of the 20th century, there existed a
gentleman’s agreement, “an agreement between Major League owners not to sign
Black baseball players to their team.” 23 A Sporting News article from 1911
describes the predicament, “Of course there is no rule in the National Agreement
that prevents a club from employing colored or partially colored players. At the
same time, nothing darker than an Indian has ever been tolerated.” 24 In 1911, the
Cincinnati Reds signed two light-skinned Cuban players, infielder Rafael Almeida
and outfielder Armando Marsans. 25 Unlike Bellan before them, Almeida and
Marsans had been scouted and signed directly out of Cuba into the major leagues.
The players were trailblazers for future Latin players in the United States.
Interestingly enough, Marsans had a contract dispute with the Reds after two
seasons. According to author Adrian Burgos, “knowing his worth as a talented
player after two solid big-league seasons, Marsans held out for a contract that
would pay him what a North American player earned.”
22

26

The Reds refused to

Ibid, 90.
“Negro League Baseball Museum, eMuseum”
http://coe.k-state.edu/annex/nlbemuseum/glossary.html
24
Burgos Jr., Playing America’s game, 97.
25
Bjarkman, Diamonds Around the Globe; The Encyclopedia of International Baseball (Westport,
CN: Greenwood Press, 2005) xxiii.
26
Burgos Jr., Playing America’s game, 102.
23

12

concede to his salary demands and Marsans signed with St. Louis in the Federal
League, 27 which had started in 1912 as a rival professional baseball league. It had
success luring players away from the majors mainly because it offered higher
salaries. Joe Tinker from Cincinnati was the first MLB player to switch sides and
sign with a Federal team in January 1914, doubling his salary in the process. 28
This is significant for the history of player negotiations and also Latin players’
salaries. Marsans leveraged his offer to negotiate a better deal more than six
decades before free agency and sought a salary equal to his North American
colleagues nearly four decades prior to MLB’s integration.
The Federal League had success recruiting players from both the
American and National Leagues. Out of the 286 total players who were on
Federal League rosters in 1914 and 1915, 172 had experience with the other
professional leagues. 29 After 1915, the Federal League struggled financially and
came to an agreement with the National League which allowed for the
reinstatement of players who had switched to the Federal League, compensation
to Federal League owners and withdrawal of the Federal League anti-trust suit
against organized baseball.
Only light-skinned Latin Americans were signed (passing as white), often
ignoring Cuba’s best players like José Mendez, the “Black Diamond” whom Hall
of Fame third baseman John J. McGraw “considered a fair rival to his own crack

27

Ibid, 102.
Emil Rothe, “Was the Federal League a Major League?” (SABR: Research Journals Archive),
no post date http://research.sabr.org/journals/federal-league-a-major-league
29
Ibid.
28
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ace Christy Mathewson.” 30 Light skinned players like Cuban born Adolfo Luque
did well. He broke into the majors full time in 1918 with the Boston Braves,
pitching the first ever shutout by a Latin major leaguer. 31

Luque had a

spectacular career, amassing 193 wins— one season with 27 victories— and
being admitted to the Hall of Fame. 32

Photo 1: Dolf Luque circa 1925
Source: Baseball with a Latin Beat; A History of the Latin American Game
Peter C. Bjarkman

Clark Griffith was the manager of the Cincinnati Reds when they
barnstormed Cuba and signed Marsans and Almeida. By 1919, he had become the
team president for the Washington Senators. Griffith hired Joe Cambria as a Latin
American scout, the first major-league scout in the Caribbean.

33

The partnership

of Cambria and Griffith was instrumental in expanding MLB’s market for foreign
players. From 1935 to 1945, 40% of Latin American major leaguers debuted as
Senators. 34 Though baseball was not yet integrated, the game was much more

30

Bjarkman, Diamonds Around the Globe, 5
Michael Oleksak and Mary Adams Oleksak, Beisbol: Latin Americans and the Grand Old
Game, (Grand Rapids, MI: Masters Press, 1991), 27.
32
Ibid, 28.
33
Ibid, 151.
34
Ibid, 151.
31
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inclusive than it had been twenty years earlier. Baseball historian Adrian Burgos
noted,
Griffith brought Cambria on board to save Washington money.
Their agreement called for Cambria to receive a commission for
each Cuban prospect who secured a roster spot with either the
Senators or one of its minor-league teams. The arrangement gave
Cambria incentive to sign as many prospects as possible— the
more players who made the grade, the higher his commission.
Over the next twenty-five years Cambria signed over four hundred
Cubans. 35
Cambria is both revered and reviled by baseball historians for his role in
scouting in Latin America. He was the pioneer of signing Cubans to the major
leagues and over the years he helped hundreds of players as well as expanded the
opportunity of the major leagues abroad. However, he was derided for exploiting
Cuban players. Cuban journalist Jess Losada deemed Cambria the “Christopher
Columbus of baseball,” for his neocolonial approach.

36

Cambria was using the

economic and cultural pressures available to him to persuade Latin Americans to
sign with the Senators, still some American journalists opposed the Senators’ new
Latin American signing strategy. Shirley Povich of the Washington Post
explained Cambria’s reasoning as, “he has learned that in Cuba ball players can
be had cheaply. He clinks a few pesos in their ears and they put their marks on a
contract.” 37
Cambria’s approach nevertheless aided the major leagues to be more
inclusive, years before Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier in 1947. Other
American major-league teams had yet to scout internationally. According to

35

Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game,151.
Ibid, 152.
37
Ibid, 153.
36
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Ruben Amaro, former scouting director and current general manager for the
Philadelphia Phillies, “Cambria had Cuba all to himself, so the Washington
Senators monopolized the talent. All these kids were desperate to sign.” 38 Without
competition, the Senators took advantage of the market. Cambria first signed
Roberto Estalella as a major leaguer in 1935. The economic dividends to Cambria
and the Senators were enormous. Cambria received $10,000 for delivering the
contract, the Senators got an inexpensive major-league-ready third baseman
without paying Estalella a signing bonus. 39

Cambria’s scouting approach

transformed baseball into an international game. Playing games abroad, also
known as barnstorming, as was done in Cuba, raised excitement for the game in
foreign countries. Signing foreign players who excelled at the highest level
increased the sport’s popularity both at home and abroad, translated into increased
ticket sales, and later increased television viewership and revenues. By the early
1950s (after MLB integration), the number of Latin American players increased,
with more than half being Cuban. For the first time in MLB history, other
countries such as the Dominican Republic and Venezuela were also represented. 40
Aside from scouting in Cuba for over 25 years, Cambria also signed the
first Nicaraguan (Gilberto Hooker) and Venezuelan (Alex Carrasquel) to play as
major leaguers. Cambria’s legacy in baseball is controversial, but it is
monumental. His signings did not lead the Washington Senators to on field
success; still thousands of foreign players had the opportunity to play in MLB
because of his foresight. Griffith and Cambria were unconventional and creative
38

Oleksak, Beisbol: Latin Americans and the Grand Old Game, 43-44.
Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 153.
40
Ibid, 385.
39
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in building the team, and most importantly they challenged the color and language
barriers. Nonetheless, it is generally accepted among sports historians and
baseball personnel that MLB began Latin American recruitment for economic
reasons: they could be signed for much less.
Cuban teams dominated international play during the first years of the
Caribbean World Series. Created in 1948, the Caribbean World Series included
Puerto Rico, Cuba, Panama and Venezuela. The tournament allowed the best
professional players from their respective home countries to showcase their skills.
In the 12 years of the Caribbean World Series, Cuba won 51 of 71 games for a
.718 average, took seven of the 12 titles, and was undefeated in three of the 12

Photo 2: Jose Mendez, El Diamante Negro/The Black Diamond
Source: Diamonds Around the Globe; The Encyclopedia of International Baseball
Peter C. Bjarkman

tournaments. 41 From 1900 to 1950, there were 53 Latin Americans who signed
with the major leagues. 45 were Cubans. 42 By the 1950s, other major league
teams took notice of the Senators’ strategy. Starting in the 1960s, the percentage
of Cubans signed (compared to other Latin Americans) declined considerably due
to the new Cuban government and the resulting American embargo. Teams
41
42

Oleksak, Beisbol: Latin Americans and the Grand Old Game, 76.
Bjarkman, Baseball with a Latin Beat, 385.
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shifted their Latin American recruitment to other nations. Even so, Cuba has
continued playing baseball with its own professional leagues and the sport is that
country’s pastime. In international play, the Cubans have continued to show their
prowess. By 2004, the Cuban team had won eleven gold medals in the Pan
American Games, while the Americans, Dominican and Venezuelans had just
won once each. 43 In the five years that baseball was an official Olympic sport
(1992-2008), Cuba won 3 gold medals and two silver medals. In comparison, the
U.S. won 1 gold medal and no silver medals. 44

Mexico
Baseball was first played in Mexico during the late 1870s. By 1887, the
Mexico Club was created in Mexico City. 45 The origins of Mexican baseball
remain disputed, but there are two events that are documented. One, is “sailors
from an American ship (the Montana) docked at Guaymas in 1877 and staged a
baseball contest witnessed by local residents.” 46 A second account also from
1877, names an American foreman, Johnny Tyson, who while constructing
railroads in Nuevo Laredo near the Texas border, taught the game to Mexican
day-laborers and organized teams. 47
Professional baseball in Mexico began in 1925. 48 The first 15 years of
professional baseball were dominated by five teams that barnstormed in the

43

Bjarkman, Diamonds Around the Globe, 26.
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United States and Cuba, similar to Puerto Rico and Cuba’s early baseball
history. 49 In 1940, Jorge Pasquel bought the Mexican League and began an
ambitious plan to increase the Mexican gate by recruiting top American players
from MLB. In order to successfully recruit American players from MLB, Pasquel
had to offer inflated salaries. He offered contracts to Ted Williams and Joe
DiMaggio, multiyear deals for more than $100,000 a year (roughly double what
their teams were paying them in 1946).

50

Although no future hall of famers

signed with the Mexican League, Pasquel did sign the 1945 American League
home run leader Vern Stephens and 17 other major league players as well as some
minor leaguers. 51

Photo 3: Jorge Pasquel
Source: Diamonds Around the Globe; The Encyclopedia of International Baseball
Peter C. Bjarkman

The signings and the huge salaries irked American team owners. At the
time, there was no free agency and the reserve clause (described in Chapter 3)
was still in effect. The MLB owners publically ridiculed Pasquel and threatened
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MLB players with suspensions upon their return if they stayed in Mexico.

52

Pasquel was ahead of his time and future players are indebted to him for his
contributions to players’ salaries and movement. Before his challenge to MLB’s
worldwide monopoly on the sport, all players were available for the Americans to
sign. Pasquel put it best when he spoke about Mexican players being signed by
the MLB, “Those days are gone forever. Now, it’s every man for himself and
players looking for bigger salaries will come to the Mexican League, instead of
shunning us for attractive major league offers from the past.” 53 Though his
ambitious idea ultimately failed, in 1949 Jorge Pasquel forced MLB to agree that
neither league would poach from the other. This agreement separated Mexico
from other baseball producing foreign countries, by elevating its negotiating
position. Pasquel forever changed MLB players’ perspectives on salaries. He
promoted the idea of free agency and much higher salaries decades before those
changes occurred.
Pasquel’s raids on American MLB players subsequently led to the 1955
agreement by which the Mexican League became part of the of the US minor
league system. 54Though the Mexican League is a AA league, it has “considerably
more freedom than US and Canadian… or Caribbean winter leagues.” 55 Players
in the Liga Mexicana de Beisbol (LMB) have a more rigid relationship between
player and owner. Under the agreement,
A Mexican player who wishes to play in the US or
Canadian major or minor leagues can only do so if his contract is
52
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acquired from a MexL [Mexican League] (summer league) team
(thus, unlike Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela,
Mexican players cannot be freely recruited and signed by ML
scouts); and (2) any Mexican player who is “free agent” vis-à-vis
US/Canadian clubs and who desires to return to play in Mexico
can only do so with the MexL club that originally assigned him to
the US or Canada, since MexL clubs retain “rights of return” as to
those players unless the MexL team concerned has sold or traded
those rights. 56
The Mexican League’s agreement is similar to the original reserve clause
(which will be discussed in more detail in chapter three). Unlike players from
other Latin American countries, MLB teams have to reimburse the player’s
Mexican League team. Usually, “prices asked are often high enough to make up
for lost future revenue.” 57 This process has severely limited the number of
Mexican major leaguers.
Mexico’s agreement with MLB has kept Mexican players in the Mexican
League and deterred MLB organizations from scouting, developing, and signing
them. The LMB has developed a system of organized, professional baseball very
similar to the MLB’s blueprint. There is a sixteen-team league, divided evenly
into north and south divisions. 58 There are also two rookie leagues, the Liga del
Norte de Mexico and Liga del Norte Sonora, 59 which serve as minor leagues for
the sixteen teams of the LMB.

Mexico has both a winter and summer

professional league, but unlike Venezuela or the Dominican Republic, the winter
league is less important as there are fewer MLB players who go to Mexico to play
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during the MLB offseason. 60 However, the winter league still fields eight clubs
who play a 68 game regular season schedule from October to December. 61
Similar to other countries in Latin America,
An amateur draft, like [that] held in the United States, is something
that is nonexistent in Mexico. Actually, scouts never seek talent in
high schools or colleges due to the lack of baseball teams in
schools. In Mexico, baseball is played through “weekend leagues”
in which kids and adults alike play for the fun of the sport. It is in
the “weekend leagues” where Liga Mexicana de Beisbol (LMB)
scouts look to find talent. 62

Mexican League teams understood the value of creating academies to
further instruct and develop players at a young age. In 1983, an academy was built
in Pasteje, north of Mexico City at the behest of a team owner, Alejo Peralta. 63
Pasteje was a centrally operated academy that produced players for all LMB
teams who could later draft them. 64 After a fire destroyed the academy, a new
facility was built in 1995. Located fifty miles outside of the large city of
Monterey, the Centro de Desarrollo del Beisbol Mexicano (Center for the
Development of Mexican Baseball) became the new league academy. Recently,
there have been more academies built by Mexican entrepreneurs.
In Oaxaca in 2009, “the billionaire Alfredo Harp Helú opened [a] baseball
academy, La Academia de Béisbol Alfredo Harp Helú.” 65 The private academy
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sends its players mostly to the owners’ two Mexican League teams, Mexico
City’s Diablo Rojos and the Oaxaca Guerreros as well as to the LMB academy in
Monterey. 66 Roberto Osuna, a pitching prospect, is now on the Toronto Blue Jays
and a few others are in Dominican MLB academies, showing the potential success
of the academy system of player development. The academy scouts over 2,000
players across Mexico and enrolls them from all states to train. Forty-five players
train at a time in the academy, which Omar Minaya, Senior Vice President with
the San Diego Padres called, “the No. 1 academy in Latin America.” 67
Puerto Rico
Baseball was first played in Puerto Rico in 1898, after a Spanish diplomat
who had learned the game in Cuba brought it to the island. 68 American military
personnel also played the game and continued to introduce it to Puerto Ricans. 69
Similar to Cuba, by 1918 major league teams as well as Negro League and Cuban
all-star teams were barnstorming the island. 70 Their professional league, the
PRWL, with a winter season, began in 1940 and has continued since. 71 Few
Puerto Ricans played MLB until after 1950.
Puerto Rican players enjoyed great success in the majors from the
beginning. Roberto Clemente and Orlando Cepeda who played for the Pittsburgh
Pirates and San Francisco Giants respectively, were the first two Puerto Rican hall
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of famers. 72 During the 1960s and 1970s Puerto Rico supplied the major leagues
with the most Latin American players. In the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s they
produced the second most foreign major leaguers. 73
Puerto Rico (a U.S. territory) has had two drastically different experiences
during the last century’s relationship with MLB. As has been shown, Puerto Rico
has been one of the leaders in foreign-born signees. Up until the late 1980s,
Puerto Rico was similar to the other Latin American countries producing baseball
players. Similar to Joe Cambria’s relationship with Cuba, the San Diego Padres
scout Luis Rosa enjoyed a near monopoly on signing Puerto Rican talent in the
1980s. Rosa used his Puerto Rican background and charm to become the
preferred major league scout on the island. 74 Rosa’s success was meteoric: he
signed Benito Santiago, Carlos Baerga, Robby Alomar and Sandy Alomar Jr.75
The Padres also made their first World Series appearance in 1984. Other
organizations took notice.
In 1990, however, Puerto Rico was added to the first-year player draft,
which also includes players from the United States and Canada. Because teams
could no longer sign players directly from the island, they did not need to invest
in developing talent there. Since the academy system operates under the
sponsorship of individual organizations, it would not be prudent for teams to
invest in player training if the player could then be drafted and signed by another
team. Puerto Rico had 135 native-born players debut in the majors through
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1990. 76 Since 1991, there have been 100 Puerto Rican players to debut.77
Compared to other Latin American countries in the same time period of 19902015, Puerto Rico has declined as a center of player recruitment and production.

Dominican Republic
After the Spanish government left the Dominican Republic in 1865, the
again independent country sought to modernize and expand the sugar trade. 78 To
obtain the capital needed to boost sugar production, the Dominican government
invited foreign investment. As a result, “by 1900 the San Domingo Improvement
Company, owned by the United States, was so diversified and the Dominican
government was so indebted to it that the company took over the administration
of the national customs revenues as security for its loans to the government.” 79 As
Dominican debts grew, the government increased taxation, further damaging the
local economy and driving small farmers off of their land. As the Dominican
economy faltered, the government failed to make foreign debt payments and in
1916 the United States invaded, occupying the Customs Houses (to insure
payment). U.S. Marines continued occupation until 1924, collecting tax revenue
and implementing changes to the government that better suited American
interests.
In 1930, the Dominican Republic elected President Rafael Trujillo.
Trujillo is remembered as a violent, sadistic dictator who used the office to enrich
76
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himself and his family. He was, like most Dominicans, an ardent baseball fan.
Trujillo invited the Reds to visit and play exhibition games and in 1937, created a
national tournament between the best players. Trujillo even recruited top Cuban
and American Negro League stars such as Satchel Paige, Martin Dihigo and Josh
Gibson (Latin American nations did not have legal segregation although class and
race were often related).
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Aside from this international tournament, Dominican

baseball did not expand as hoped.

Photo 4: James “Cool Papa” Bell and Josh Gibson in Dominican uniform
for 1937 tournament
Source: The Tropic of Baseball; Baseball in the Dominican Republic, Rob Ruck

Unlike the Cubans, no Dominicans played in the major leagues before
Ozzie Virgil in 1956. Part of this was due to a lack of training. Sugar refineries
ran a semi-pro league with employees. 81 In 1955, Trujillo moved the baseball
season to the winter, allowing players to play in the United States and return
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home to play ball. The move also allowed Dominican teams to sign major league
players for their short season. Trujillo’s brother-in-law’s team, Escogido, had the
best talent with great players like Juan Marichal and Felipe Alou. 82
Trujillo also placed his son in charge of negotiating between Dominican
players and MLB. 83 The men responsible for signing the first two young
prospects, Alou and Marichal, were San Francisco Giants’ scout Alex Pompez
and University of Santo Domingo coach Horacio Martinez. 84 Due to the change in
the Dominican season schedule and MLB’s integration in 1947, more Dominicans
were signed.
Following the pioneer Washington Senators, the New York Giants
increased Latin American recruitment in the latter part of the 1950s. Alex
Pompez, used his background to gain the trust of prospects. A Cuban-American
entrepreneur, he had a long MLB history. In the 1920s, he owned and managed
the Cuban Stars, a Negro League team and he created a new Negro League team,
the New York Cubans in the 1930s. 85
In the 1970s, the Toronto Blue Jays and Los Angeles Dodgers invested in
the Dominican Republic and the number of Dominicans signed increased. Almost
as many players made it to the major leagues as from Puerto Rico. This increase
continued as academies were created (See Graph 1). The Dominican Republic
benefitted greatly from MLB integration, which was an even larger impediment to
their participation than Trujillo and the Dominican Professional League.
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Graph 1: Number of Foreign Born MLB Players by Decade 1900-1990
Source: Baseball with a Latin Beat; A History of the Latin American Game, Peter C. Bjarkman.

Baseball is an especially contentious labor issue in the Dominican
Republic because of the country's history with the United States. Not only did
American troops invade in 1916 and again in 1965, but U.S. companies have
owned and controlled most of the Dominican Republic. The economy was
dominated by the sugar industry. Wages were meager and since the majority of
the population worked at unskilled, manual labor, baseball became a refuge. The
game was revered on the island and the absolute pinnacle for a young Dominican
ballplayer was to make it to the major leagues in the United States.
This was and is true for many foreign born players: the dream to play in
the United States, succeed, and make their home country proud. For Dominicans,
the motivation is more personal. They have a saying on the island that the
Dominicans have to “quitarle la comida,” which translates to take their food away
from them. This can be credited to foreign players having to out-work American
counterparts to take their jobs, but the saying could also evoke a deeper ethos. For
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the average Dominican man, baseball is the one profession by which he can
dominate Americans.
Some writers such as Alan Klein, see MLB as equivalent to any other
corporation that will use resources (players) to maximize profit. While true, it is
an economic advantage to sign and develop players in the Dominican Republic.
The increase in Latin American recruitment is also due to MLB’s investment
during the last three decades.
According to Baseball Reference, of the 18,591 in MLB all time, 2,254
were foreign born. 86

87

Looking at those numbers, it becomes apparent that

foreign players are a large part of MLB’s history. 12.12% of all its players have
been born outside the United States. Out of those 2,254 foreign born players,
Puerto Rico has provided 253 players and Canada 244 players, though many have
come through the same draft as U.S. born players. The Dominican Republic has
by far the highest number of players who have made it to the majors with 642.
Second is Venezuela with 341 players. Other notable countries with more than a
hundred players are Cuba with 193 and Mexico with 118 (See Appendix 1 for a
complete listing by nation and decade). 88
As noted in Graph 2, the number of foreign players in MLB between 1990
and 2015 was 1,121. This represents a 671% increase from those who played
between 1980 and 1990. Of the 2015 MLB debuting players (see Graph 3), nearly
half were from the Dominican Republic.
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Graph 2: Number of Foreign Born MLB Players for Selected Years
Source: Baseball with a Latin American Beat; A History of the Latin American Game,
Peter C. Bjarkman
Baseballreference.com/bio

Graph 3: Percentage of Latin American MLB Players by Country of
Origin 1990-2015
Source: Baseballreference.com

Prior to the Great Depression the percentage of foreign born players in
MLB fluctuated between 3-5%. During the Great Depression the number of
30

foreign born players dropped to 1.6%. Once MLB integrated the number of
foreign born players rose to 9% and has consistently risen since then. In 2015
more than one quarter of all Major League players were foreign born (See Graph
4). MLB has expanded the league over the past century. In 1960 there were a total
of 16 teams, by 1998 there were 30 franchises. 89 Though the number of total
major leaguers has almost doubled in the last fifty years, the proportion of foreign
born players in addition to the number has risen drastically.

Graph 4: Percentage of Foreign Born MLB Players 1901-2015
Source: “The Rise of Foreign-Born Baseball Players Has Stopped,” Cork Gaines,
mlbreference.com/bio

As is evident, foreign player participation skyrocketed in the last quarter
of the twentieth century. These countries set up their own professional leagues,
developed their own style of play, and faced off against international competition.
Cuba was the first large baseball producing foreign country in the first half of the
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20 century. Mexico became a player next, because of Jorge Pasquel’s recruitment
of major league Americans in the 1940 for the Mexican League. Puerto Rico and
The Dominican Republic had baseball just as long and began producing MLB
players in the 1940s and 1950s. Each country’s political and economic systems
were factors in MLB’s business approach and expansion into Latin America.
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CHAPTER TWO
AMERICAN FARM LEAGUES
AND DOMINICAN ACADEMIES

Once Latin American players had MLB success, teams understood that
other nations had the capability to produce more MLB caliber players. While Joe
Cambria had begun the “Latin players on the cheap” approach of signing Cubans,
the Senators had not improved on the field by creating a factory for production
abroad to further improve their newly signed players’ skills. The evolution of
development and training of Latin American players by MLB marked an
enormous change for the game. This colonial outpost was the first sign of
globalization by MLB. The Latin American signing and training strategy was not
honed by MLB teams on a massive scale until the 1980s, but the roots of the
system preceded that by more than fifty years.
American Farm Leagues
The baseball academy traces its roots to the American farm leagues.
Branch Rickey of the Cardinals began the first farm system sometime after 1919
when he became the team’s general manager. It has been defined as “direct
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control of minor-league teams by the major-league parent organization, creating a
production line of talent.” 90 Its goal was to save the organization money. If
Rickey could train and prepare young players who were not signed by other
teams, then he could have a financial advantage in player production. The
Cardinals bought teams in Houston and Fort Smith, and twenty years later
controlled 32 minor-league teams with around 650 players. 91 This innovative new
system of player development was not only cost-effective but it reaped an
immediate benefit: wins. The Cardinals won nine National League pennants
between 1926 and 1946. 92 In fact, the Cardinals controlled so much talent that
they were able to sell their players to other teams, reaping additional profit. This
success was partially due to Rickey’s control over players and their salaries.
Rickey used a tactic called a desk contract to further improve his profit margin.93
The desk contract was a way to tentatively sign a player after a tryout, send him to
a minor-league affiliate and then cut him at will, essentially a non-binding
agreement.
Baseball, thanks to Branch Rickey's innovation of the farm system, has an
expansive system of affiliated minor league baseball teams. The minor league
teams were originally deemed “farm clubs” because the players would grow and
ripen before being ready for the majors. Aside from the 25 men on the active
roster of a major league team, there are six minor leagues with players signed by
that team. These include triple A, double A, single A (high and low), short season
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A, and rookie ball. With 25 players a team, that equates to 175 players per
organization. The additional players’ salaries raises the cost of the team’s overall
payroll, but the system ultimately benefits the owners by spreading out their
investments, maximizing the chances of success.
Another aspect of Rickey’s minor league system changed scouting,
signing and player development: the concept of “quality out of quantity.”94
Instead of signing top players who teams felt were ready to contribute
immediately (and who competitors would surely compete for), the Cardinals
looked for potential in their signees. They were willing to invest the money and
time it would take to develop these players. This strategy changed scouting
forever and it also set the groundwork for how teams would scout and sign
foreign Latin American players. Rickey hosted tryout camps to discover
prospects. His emphasis was on all around athleticism, most importantly running
speed as opposed to expertise in the field or at the plate. This became the model
for Dominican academies.

Photo 5: Branch Rickey
Source: baseballsacramento.com
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Buscones
Buscones, literally means “searchers,” in Spanish. However, in baseball it
also means player developers. 95 Baseball historian Alan Klein writes that, “The
term is derived from the Spanish word buscar (to search for) and refers to the
search, in this case, for baseball talent.”

96

The buscon searches the country for

athletic youngsters. If the parents agree, the buscon takes the child to a baseball
camp where he will be fed and housed for the better part of three or four years
while learning to play baseball. These trainers are essential to the system of player
development in the Dominican Republic. For players under the MLB signing age
of seventeen, these buscones help youngsters develop both their bodies and their
baseball skills in hopes of signing with a MLB team in the future. Klein’s work is
the most in-depth study of the Dominican baseball market in the 1980s. He
explains why the history and culture of the country have contributed to success in
baseball, and also its exploitation. Klein uses the global commodity chain model
to better explain the specific relationship between Dominican players and MLB:
As “labor”, ‘baseball players’ are unique in three very important
ways: (1) They are both the commodity being produced and the
producer of the commodity; (2) they constitute a radical departure
from conventional views of Third World labor in that foreign labor
is typically characterized as abundant, unskilled, and cheap, but
Dominican players are the converse (i.e., relatively rare, skilled
and very well paid); and (3) the commodities that typically are
considered in these kinds of analyses are not human beings. 97
Many writers in the United States and employees of MLB have demonized
buscones. They accuse buscones of taking advantage of the players, whether it is
95
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because they take too large a portion of the player’s bonus, sign players who are
too young, or because they manipulate children and MLB by fraud, falsifying
birth records, assuming other people’s identities and even through the use of
performance enhancing drugs. Steve Fainaru of the Washington Post calls the
buscones system “a breeding ground for exploitation and corruption.” 98 At a
Dominican academy tryout, Alan Klein interviewed an anonymous director of
international scouting for a major league team about a player negotiation with a
buscon:
I’m not giving in to that little pimp! That’s all they are. They’re
throwing figures around and think we’re gonna jump at ‘em. [The
player] wants $1 million? What kind of horseshit number is that?
We’ll decide what the number will be, not them. Hell, most of
these guys don’t have a clue how to prepare these guys. We’ll
make an offer based on what we think of the market and be
prepared to walk away from it. 99

Photo 6: Buscon Astin Jacobo Jr.
Source: espn.go.com

The Dominican perspective on buscones is very different. They
acknowledge the poor examples but understand the benefits to the island. Alan
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Klein interviewed some of the Dominican directors of MLB academies about
buscones. They observed:
I hate to admit it, [but the buscon system] really does work in [the
players’] favor… We’ve got kids thirteen years old, fourteen years
old, with talent. [The buscones] feed them, give them some better
instruction, give them a chance to develop every day. If you go
back to the old system, nobody would discover them, [and] nobody
would help them. 100
There are important differences between buscones and scouts and/or
agents in the United States. While scouts are MLB employees merely searching
for talent and agents work directly for that talent, buscones are self-employed.
They search for talent, develop it and try to sell that talent to a MLB team,
keeping a portion of the signing bonus as their fee. Buscones generally keep a
higher percentage of the player’s signing bonus than American agents. Samuel
Herrera, a Dominican buscon “succeeded in getting one of his players signed to a
significant $400,000 contract, for which his commission was $100,000.” 101

Map 2: MLB Players by Country of Origin 1950-1990
Source: Viva Baseball! Latin Major Leaguers and Their Special Hunger Samuel O.
Regalado
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This 25% commission is standard in the Dominican Republic for buscones
and player trainers. Astin Jacobo, a noted Dominican buscon, explained that
“these certified agents like Rob Plummer or even bigger guys like Scott Boras…
can get your players the most money… and they get a 5 percent cut of the 30
percent I might make.”
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Obviously the amount of money the buscones invest in

the players is substantial and has to be taken into account when considering their
commissions. Feeding, maybe housing, and training a teenage boy is costly, and
since buscones do not have all their players sign, they are never paid for their
investment in most.
As demonstrated by the number of Dominican players signed to the MLB
between 1950 and 1990, the Dominican academy system and buscones resulted in
an increasing number of major leaguers (See map 2).
Howie Haak, was one of the pioneering MLB scouts in Latin America. He
helped scout and sign players for the Pittsburgh Pirates from the 1940s through
the 1970s. 103 Haak was hired by Branch Rickey, who had taken over as Vice
President and General Manager for the Pirates in 1950 after leaving the Dodgers.
Haak scouted Roberto Clemente and persuaded Rickey to sign him away from the
Dodgers who had assigned him to the minor leagues. This success pushed Rickey
and Haak to continue searching for Latin American ballplayers. Haak started in
Puerto Rico, Cuba and then the Dominican Republic. By 1973, he had “native
bird dogs” [scouts] in those countries as well as Panama, Venezuela, Colombia,
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Nicaragua, and the Virgin Islands. 104 One of the reasons the Pirates scouted Latin
America so hard was that they were struggling financially and could not compete
with larger market teams. 105 Even in 1973, top North American players were
receiving signing bonuses of $100,000 while Caribbean players got no more than
$20,000 and most were given around $1,000. 106 The Pirates also made money
from Latin American players by trading or selling them once they had shown
promise. Haak and Rickey helped rebuild the Pirates, who were last in the
National League in 1950. Rickey retired in 1954, but helped establish his
legendary scouting and minor league systems which led to the Pirates being one
of the most successful teams of the 1960s and 1970s.

Toronto Blue Jays’ Academy
As explained in the next chapter, salaries for major league players have
increased exponentially. The rise in salaries for North American players led to
MLB seeking even more Latin Americans, because their signing bonuses were
much cheaper. As an example of this trend, in the 1970s, the Toronto Blue Jays
hired former Dominican big leaguer Epy Guerrero as a scout, who was
instrumental in building the first baseball academy in the Dominican Republic.
Academies were defined by writers as “glorified dormitories surrounded by
practice fields where young men would be drilled in baseball fundamentals.”
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Academies also offered teams a cheaper method to further train and improve

104

Ibid.
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
Breton and Villegas, Away Games, 41.
105

40

ballplayer’s skills. For example, the Philadelphia Phillies in 1981 spent on
average $25,000 developing their Latin American prospects compared to
$355,000 for North American players.
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The staggering difference in cost made

it obvious to all teams that it was cost-effective to sign and try to develop players
from outside North America.
The Toronto Blue Jays became the first team to not just sign players from
Latin America, but also train them in facilities abroad. Early on, these facilities
were makeshift. A reporter from Toronto who visited the Blue Jays facility in the
Dominican Republic— “El Complejo Epy” as it is called there— described it as
“[not] a baseball complex, this is the fuckin heart of darkness.”
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Though that

reporter exaggerated, according to author Gary Joyce the early MLB facilities
abroad “would be considered insufficient for even the most deprived U.S. high
school baseball program.” 110 Though modest, Epy Guerrero’s training facility was
the first of its kind and would be the model which other major league
organizations followed. Bought and developed in 1975, the training camp
contained “a full-size ballpark where from September to March, play starts at 9:00
am. From 35 to 40 kids stay there for a week at a time. Adjacent are chicken
coops and three acres of vegetables to defray costs.”
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across the country or having intermittent tryouts, the Blue Jays could bring
prospects to them and be able to develop the players. As their Dominican players
excelled in the 1980s, the Blue Jays began to see their investment mature.
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American League MVP George Bell (1987), All Star shortstop Tony Fernandez
and co-rookie of the year Alfredo Griffin (1979) were all Dominican signees. 112
Los Angeles Dodgers’ Academy
In the 1980s, the Los Angeles Dodgers were the first team to invest
heavily in Latin American recruiting and established the modern MLB academy.
Rafael Avila, a Dodger scout of Cuban descent, sought to create a baseball
training camp like Epy Guerrero of the Blue Jays had. When the Dodgers initially
refused to invest, Avila and his assistant, Elvio Jimenez, built two extra rooms in
Elvio’s backyard, furnished them with sixteen beds and had Elvio’s wife cook.
They created a second Dominican academy. Soon, the Dodgers were convinced to
invest in proper facilities for its Dominican outpost, spending $400,000 for a 50acre complex and furnishing it with state-of-the-art amenities. The Campo Las
Palmas opened in 1987 and boasted, “fifty acres of land that comprises two major
league-quality fields, a sparkling complex of dormitories, a cafeteria, and offices
framed by tropical farmland that produces much of its own food, Campo Las
Palmas employs more than fifty people. As many as forty rookies (mostly
Dominican, but some Venezuelans too) are tutored in Dodgers fundamentals.”113
The beautiful complex signaled a first-class organization and helped the Dodgers
sign top Dominican prospects. The Dodgers surpassed the Blue Jays as the top
producer of Dominican talent in the late 1980s. Most notably, the Dodgers were
able to sign and develop José Offerman, Jose Vizcaino, Raul Mondesi, and the
brothers Ramón and Pedro Martínez. Pedro made history by becoming just the
112
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second Dominican-born player, after Juan Marichal, to make the MLB Hall of
Fame.

Map 3: Location of Dominican Academies 2015
Source: http;//www.mlb.com/academies.jsp

However, Dominican players experienced problems adjusting to the
United States, so teams worked on improving their academies by adding personal
development to the curriculum. At the outset, Epy Guerrero’s Blue Jays complex
had players work out and train for a week, or a few weeks at most. The
dormitories were in constant flux as new players came to tryout. This lack of
structure and control irked major league teams and scouts. Teams realized they
needed to spend more time teaching the rookies not only fundamentals in baseball
but also in social skills to better prepare them for life in the United States.
According to Oakland Athletics instructor Ron Plaza, “Getting the complex was
important because we never had control of these kids before. The only time we
had them was on the field. Then they would go home and we’d have lots of
problems. We had a couple kids walking around in Santo Domingo one night and
43

they ended up in jail.”
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Ensuring players were eating well and developing their

bodies through weight lifting and exercise was worth the rising costs for teams.
Still, the total cost for the land and construction of the Oakland Athletics
academy, which opened in May 1994, “was roughly $1 million, or what the
Athletics and other teams spend on the bonus of a single top American prospect.
“ 115 Today, all MLB teams have facilities in the Dominican Republic (See
Appendix 2).
Age Limits
Early Dominican scouts roamed the country and signed players at will
without minimum salaries or age restrictions. This changed in 1984 when Epy
Guerreo signed shortstop Jimy Kelly, a talented prospect many teams had
scouted, prior to his fourteenth birthday, making him the youngest player ever to
sign with an organization.
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This went too far and public outrage about his age

forced a change to international signings. 117 The Dominican Republic’s President
Hugo Blanco issued Presidential Decree 3450 that same year mandating a
minimum signing age of seventeen. 118 In Puerto Rico, a similar experience forced
regulation. Ruben Amaro, director of Latin American scouting for the
Philadelphia Phillies signed Jorge Lebron to a contract of $38,000 in 1975.119
Lebron was only 14 years old, and the negative publicity regarding the move led
to Puerto Rico implementing a 16-year-old minimum signing age.
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Player Retention
One major issue with the Dominican academy system is player retention.
The first problem is the limited amount of visas available to foreign players. As of
2002, each major league team has 28 visas for foreign players, or 840 visas for all
30 teams.
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After these competitive visas have been issued, there are over 2,200

foreign-born minor league players under contract who are left out.

121

Allan Klein

examined Dominican players who were signed in the 1970s by major league
teams and found, for example, that only three percent of Dodgers signees made it
to the major leagues. 122 As of 2012, only about three percent of the total prospects
signed out of the Dominican Republic eventually make it to the majors. 123
Because major league organizations had only so many visas and so many
spots available on minor league rosters, the rest of the signed, foreign players
were left in limbo to the benefit of the teams. In the United States, becoming a
professional baseball player is also a longshot, but the process of signing with an
organization improves a prospect’s chances. According to Baseball America,
17.2% of players drafted in the annual amateur draft will reach the major leagues
for at least one game. 124 An American born draftee is nearly six times more likely
to make it to the big leagues.
The development of the academy system is paramount to understanding
the relationship between MLB and Latin American countries. Its strategy harkens
back to Branch Rickey’s use of the farm system innovation. Just as his St. Louis
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Cardinals teams had great success in the 1930s because of the vast depth of
talented players the organization had under contract, the academy system of the
Dominican Republic allowed teams a greater chance to sign and develop great
players. Therefore, the buscones in Latin America have an important role. They
are both agent and coach. Their work is essential to help produce talented
Dominican players, though their transgressions have been vilified greatly in the
United States. Although fraught with many problems, they are necessary and
beneficial. The success of Latin American players in the 1950s and 1960s along
with the integration of MLB changed baseball. Major league teams began
recruiting in more Latin American countries. Many teams were still undecided on
how to develop prospects they recruited in Latin America. Teams would not do so
until they had an economic incentive.
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CHAPTER THREE
REVENUE, SALARIES & DRAFT

When casual baseball fans consider salaries in MLB, they most likely
think of the incredible amount that best players earn (such as Alex Rodriguez and
his $252 million-plus contract signed in 2000). 125 This type of example is
nowhere near the reality of most MLB players. Of course, they earn generous pay.
But baseball is a business and like any other, the owners will look to increase
revenue and control costs; the costs for teams are mostly player salaries.
Regardless of what the average fan may think of MLB player salaries, their pay is
determined by the market and they earn a fraction of the total revenue earned.
Labor negotiations and player salaries have been divisive issues and changed
greatly over MLB history. They changed most dramatically between 1966 and
2015. Baseball’s labor movement affected teams’ player signing and development
strategy. This chapter will lay out MLB and the player’s union relationship over
125
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time and how that parallels changes and investments made by MLB in Latin
America.

Revenue
Unlike professional football (NFL) and basketball (NBA) in the United
States, MLB does not have a salary cap. This means each team is free to spend as
their owner sees fit, regardless of ticket sales, past success, or market size.
However, smaller market teams generally are at an economic disadvantage. The
New York Yankees won six world championships in the 1950s partly because of
“their ability to draw greater local revenues than their opponents.”
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Ticket sales

were the chief revenue source for teams in the 1950s. The second key source of
income for teams at the time was local media. Local media contracts for radio and
television rights moved baseball away from an attendance driven business to one
that brought the game directly to the audience. This also provided an advantage
for teams in large cities. The Dodgers of the 1950s, while still in Brooklyn,
“earned more than $750,000 for television and radio rights, which exceeded their
player payroll by $250,000.” 127 The Dodgers and Giants moved from New York
to Los Angeles and San Francisco respectively in 1958. This expanded their
markets by giving them total control of large cities, increasing television and
radio contract revenue. 128 In 1965, a shared national television contract was
signed for the first time. This initial ABC contract was for $5.7 million. Rapidly
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increasing television revenues were one of the reasons that the Major League
Baseball Players Association was able to win concessions from management, as
will be described. By 1974, the national television contract had increased to $72
million. This immediately changed baseball’s competitive landscape by providing
more parity among teams.
Almost from the inception of professional baseball in the United States,
owners and players have had an adversarial relationship, especially in regard to
salary and the reserve clause. In the early 1880s when there was only one league,
“it was quite customary for players to switch teams at will.” 129 Obviously, this
permitted players to seek higher wages. In 1880, National League officials
instituted the Reserve Rule which allowed clubs to protect five players on their
roster, excluding these players from other teams’ poaching of talent. 130 Players
formed their own league and although they outdrew the owner’s teams at the gate
in 1890, lacked sufficient resources to survive. 131 Baseball labor historian James
B. Dworkin wrote: “The two leagues compromised on a proposal that would
merge the better of their teams and establish fairer employment practices.” 132
Again between 1900 and 1902 players unionized and established their own
league, led by Clark Griffith, a pitcher who later bought the Washington Senators
who ironically, became the vanguard for recruiting foreigners. Like the earlier
player’s league, the experiment failed but resulted in higher minimum salaries for
players.
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A third union formed between 1912 and 1918. A former baseball player
and practicing attorney, David Fultz, formed the Baseball Player’s Fraternity in
large part as a weapon to counterbalance the suspension of Ty Cobb for
pummeling a fan. When he was indefinitely suspended, a brief player strike
ensued. Once Cobb was reinstated and the strike ended, the union might have
faded except for the founding of a new baseball league (the Federal League) in
1914. “Immediately, the National and American Leagues agreed to recognize the
player’s union.” 133 The Federal League went bankrupt and within three years, the
union dissolved. There were two more aborted attempts to unionize in the 1920s
and 1930s. The 1922 Supreme Court Case Federal Baseball V. National League
granted additional ammunition to owners with which to fight unions. The court
concluded that baseball was a game, not a business, and therefore exempt from
the 1890 Sherman Act, an anti-monopoly piece of legislation. 134
During the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the federal
government began to support laborers via legislation and also through regulation.
The National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935, protected union rights and
created a National Labor Relations Board in charge of investigating claims of
unfair practices by either labor or employers. Robert Murphy, a former field
examiner for the Labor Relations Board, organized a fourth baseball players’
union in 1946, called the Guild. 135 Although the Guild was very short-lived, it is
significant for two reasons: first, because the demands to be redressed were
almost identical to those of the past 50 years and second, because it became the
133
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precursor for the later successful Major League Baseball Players’ Association.
Among the items high on the Guild’s list for collective negotiations were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

End the reserve clause.
Institute arbitration for player-owner disputes.
Guarantee players a share in their purchase price.
Institute Spring Training pay.
Increase the minimum per season salary.
Reform contracts, changing the clause that owners could
cancel contracts with ten days’ notice while players had no
such remedy. 136

However brief its existence, the Guild resulted in a management contrived system
by which representative players met regularly with management to discuss
complaints. Players had no vote and management always made the final decision.
This led to the players’ organization of the Major League Baseball Players
Association (or MLBPA), which was not considered a union at birth; this came
later with the stewardship of Marvin Miller, elected first executive director in
1966. 137
Within two years, Miller negotiated the first collective bargaining
agreement which included higher minimum salaries, increases in pensions,
disability and health insurance benefits. In addition, the MLBPA was successful
in changing the grievance procedure. While the final decision had been up to the
Baseball Commissioner (similar to the NFL today), the new contract left the final
decision to an impartial arbiter agreed upon by both parties. 138 This agreement
“mark(s) the start of a new, more adversarial relationship between owners and
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players…no longer could general managers hoodwink players with impunity over
contract provisions.” 139
Less than one year later, the MLBPA agreed to financially support player
Curt Flood’s lawsuit against MLB, focusing on the reserve clause. As the case
moved through the courts, relations between MLB and MLBPA deteriorated
further. A players’ strike, the first in baseball history, resulted in the cancelation
of 86 games before a compromise was reached in April, 1972.

Photo 7: Curt Flood (left) and Marvin Miller (right), 1970
Source: Stepping Up: The Story of Curt Flood and the Fight for Baseball Players’
Rights Alex Belth

Just two months later, the U.S. Supreme court ruled against Curt Flood
and in favor of the reserve clause. Miller decided to test arbitration over the
reserve clause in 1975. Before it reached arbitration, owners and MLBPA agreed
that following six years of service, players were free agents. The reserve clause
was dead. 140 Five of the top six 1946 player Guild demands had been garnered.
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However, neither players nor owners were satisfied with the total abolition
of the reserve clause. An arbitrator ruled,
that players were not the perpetual property of their clubs as the
owners had argued but were bound by the terms of their reserve
clause for only one additional season after their contract expired.
Thus, players could become free agents and revolve to the highest
bidder, much like what occurred in the [latter]1800s. But both
players and club owners alike were against complete abolition of
the system…Thus, the 1975 negotiations featured the hammeringout of a compromise six-year reserve system that would allow free
agency after that period of service with a particular team. 141

Owners locked players out during spring training. The final agreement
“specified only that teams losing a free agent would receive one draft choice in
the amateur phase of the player draft from the team signing the free agent.” 142
In 1981 a 50-day strike resulted in the loss of “$30 million in player wages
and $72 million in owner revenues” plus a $50 million owner-operated strike
fund. 143 The latter portion of the 1994 season and playoffs were canceled due to a
strike. It is estimated that the latter cost MLB $200 million in lost revenue. 144
The reserve clause’s legality had been defined and sustained by the
Supreme Court for over half a century when the Miller-led MLBPA negotiated its
demise. As a consequence, the player’s association went on to become one of the
strongest unions in the world. In 1975, the last year before free agency, players
earned 21% of the league’s revenues. 145 By 2001, players made 56% of the
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league’s revenue. 146
Free agency and Salaries
According to Alan Klein, “From 1970 to 1990 the minimum salary for
major leaguers increased from $12,000 to $125,000 (942%) and the average
salary increased from $29,300 to $600,000 (1,948%).” In 1992 the average salary
for a major league player broke the $1 million mark for the first time. In 2001, the
average major league salary broke $2 million, rising above $3 million in 2008,
and breaking $4 million by 2015. 147
The effects of ending the reserve clause and allowing MLB players free
agency cannot be understated. The reserve clause essentially indebted a player to
a team for the duration of the team’s choosing. The overturning of the reserve
clause changed how teams budgeted and signed players. Players and owners
immediately saw the drastic difference in wages. Author Robert Lewis notes,
“The average MLB player salary grew from $52,300 in 1976 to $146,500 in
1980.” 148 By 1983, average salary had grown to $289,000. Even though salaries
have increased astronomically from 1975-2015, the MLBPA Executive Director
from 2009-2013, Michael Weiner, “constantly reminded players that ‘owners’
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desires have not changed. They want to pay players as little as possible and
control their services as long as possible.” 149
Salary and Reserve Clause Disputes
MLB faced its longest labor stoppage in 1994 because of the salary cap
issue. The owners negotiated for the salary cap as a form of cost-containment. 150
They reasoned that, “spiraling players' salaries threaten to put smaller market
teams out of business.”
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A salary cap in a professional sport, is a ‘monopsony

price-fixing’ arrangement. 152 There is only one buyer (MLB) of a product (the
players) and the buyer limits its expenses in an effort to reduce input costs and
thereby increase profits. A cap on the total amount a team may spend on player
salaries will obviously decrease the amount of money that would otherwise be
available to pay players in a free market. An additional effect of the cap is limited
player mobility. A free agent's ability to sign with a new team is limited given
that only teams not already exceeding or near the salary cap can bid on a player's
services, and then only if the acquisition will not put the team over the salary
cap. A salary cap in MLB would thus restrict competition in terms of both player
salaries and player mobility.” 153 Owners lost the salary cap fight against the
players’ union when the National Labor Relations Board cited them for unfair
labor practices and future Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor granted an
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injunction to resume play under the previous working agreement.

154

cap has still not been implemented twenty years after the strike.

The salary
155

MLB’s

revenue as an industry has exploded in the last twenty years. It was $1.4 billion in
1995, immediately after the strike and today (in 2015) is at $9 billion.
Broadcasting revenue accounts for the new business model of professional
baseball. In 2002, the national television broadcasting contract netted each team
$24 million, while the local broadcasting rights garnered each team an average of
about $19 million.156 Team revenues rose from an average of $6.4 million in 1975
to $119 million in 2002.157 These increases occurred in an era almost devoid of
inflation.

Effect of Salary Increases on Foreign Players
Though there had historically been a wage gap between Dominican
players and North American players’ signing bonuses, the nearly 300% five-year
salary increase after free agency began forced smaller market teams to become
creative in order to compete. This spawned an increased demand for Dominican
players. The difference in signing bonuses is staggering. Baseball scholar Kevin
Kerrane calculated in 1975 that “major-league organizations gave U.S.-born
players selected in the amateur draft an average signing bonus of $60,000. By

154

Cliff Corcoran, “The Strike: Who Was Right, Who Was Wrong and How It Helped Baseball,”
Sports Illustrated, August 12, 2014, http://www.si.com/mlb/2014/08/12/1994-strike-bud-seligorel-hershiser
155
Klein, Dominican Baseball, 50.
156
Michael Haupert, “The Economic History of Major League Baseball,” (University of
Wisconsin, December 3, 2007).
157
Ibid.

56

contrast, signing bonuses for foreign-born Latin Americans acquired as undrafted
free agents averaged $5,000.” 158 As Alan Klein discovered in his research,
The frequency with which Dominican players signed with U.S.
teams and went on to play in the major leagues jumped
significantly since free agency. Although 49 players made it to the
major leagues in the 15 years of the previous period, the 9 years
since 1980 have produced 58 major leaguers and this continues. 159

YEAR

AV. PLAYER

% CHANGE

SALARY
1951*

13,300

1967*

19,000

+43%

1975*

46,000

+142%

1981

185,651

+304%

1991

891,188

+380%

2001

2,264,403

+154%

2011

3,305,393

+46%

Table 1: Average MLB Player Salary- selected years
Sources: *The Business of Major League Baseball, Gerald W. Scully, Univ. of Chicago
Press, Chicago. 1989, p. 124 and http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/
salaries/avgsalaries.html

The information in Table 1 confirms that free agency motivated teams to look for
cheaper players, and the effect is that more Dominicans played in the 1980s than
all other decades combined. Klein wrote his article in 1989, and since that time,
salaries have continued to rise exponentially (See Graph 2). The 1981 federal
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minimum wage was $3.35, while in 2011 it had risen to $7.25, an increase of
116%. 160
In regards to Dominicans, I agree with Alan Klein that buscones helped
develop players further at a younger age and was invaluable in contract
negotiations with MLB teams. No longer is a young player at the mercy of a team
to negotiate a contract and a signing bonus. Also, the buscones train Dominican
players better and at a younger age to improve their skills and ultimately their
signing bonus. With the rise of the buscones, bonuses more than doubled from
2004-2008. 161 Hanley Ramírez, a future all-star, signed for a $22,000 signing
bonus in 2001 and by 2007, the average signing bonus was over $65,000.162
Besides the help of the buscones, increased competition from other MLB teams,
other baseball leagues, and added scrutiny to the paltry wages Latin American
players were receiving all helped push Dominican signing bonuses in the 2000s.
While the average 1998 major league salary was $1.3 million, the average
foreign-born Latin American player’s salary was much less.
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For example,

according to the Washington Post, “in 2000, the Cleveland Indians signed 40
players in Latin America for $700,000.” 164 This economic disparity has existed
since the very first players from the Dominican Republic were signed by MLB.
Wages have improved, specifically over the last two decades, but the gap between
Dominican and non-Dominican baseball players’ salaries remains.
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Graph 5: Average and Minimum MLB Salaries 1966-2012
Source: “MMLB Salaries Have Slowed in Past Decade,” Business Insider, July
2013.

According to authors Ronald W. Cox and Daniel Skidmore-Hess, 25% of
players on minor league rosters were foreign born in the year 1990. This increased
to 40% by the year 2000 and by 2006 Latin American players exceeded 50% of
all players signed to professional contracts in the minors. Over 80% of all foreign
born players in MLB in 2006 came from the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela. 165 Still, MLB disputes that they exploit these players. According to
MLB, relative to their other options and opportunities in their home countries,
their signing bonus is appropriate and fair. Public opinion in the 1990s sided with
the Dominican players, for escaping abject poverty and learning to succeed in a
new country. In a book review in 1999, of Away Games- the Life and Times of a
Latin Baseball Player, the New York Times wrote of the MLB-Latin American
relationship,
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Teams like the Athletics save money by filling out their minor
league rosters with young Dominicans who can be had for a
meager wage that a young American would never accept. (Tejada
signed for $2,000. The average American signing bonus is
$50,000.) It's a throw-back-the-little-ones approach; within a year
or two, most of these players have either been shipped back to the
Dominican or, if they manage to escape their handlers, are roaming
the streets of cities like New York as illegal immigrants. 166
To better understand the differences Dominicans face in signing and
negotiating contracts, one must compare their situation to those of players who
are drafted annually in the first-year draft. The lawyer Timothy Poydenis explains
how a player drafted according to draft rule 4 can negotiate:
First, a player is not obligated to sign with the team that drafted
him. Rather, the team is given the sole negotiating rights to the
player. After acquiring these rights, the team will begin the
negotiation process with the player's agent. The most important
advantage for the player is that he is not obligated to sign with the
team. Therefore, if the team fails to offer the player a desirable
contract price, the player can simply refuse to sign with the team,
return to college for another season, and then reenter the draft the
following year. This means that if a player is unsatisfied with the
amount of money that a team offers him, he can refuse to sign with
that team and remain eligible for the next year's Rule 4
Draft. Second, MLB teams are aware that players selected in the
Rule 4 Draft are afforded this layer of protection. Therefore, teams
often err on the side of caution by offering players more profitable
contracts to ensure that they sign with the team rather than reenter
the draft the following year. 167
The main point of contention in the literature on this subject is the
economic differences between players working in the same organization. Paying a
person differently based upon his country of origin violates laws enforced by the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). According
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to the EEOC, “National origin discrimination involves treating people (applicants
or employees) unfavorably because they are from a particular country or part of
the world.”

168

Baseball players from countries other than the Dominican

Republic also have a distinct advantage in gaining a higher salary. MLB has
formal agreements with some countries to respect and negotiate with the
professional teams in that country for that particular player’s rights. For example,
Fernando Valenzuela, a Mexican pitcher, was signed by the Los Angeles Dodgers
in July 1979 from his Mexican league team in Puebla for $120,000.
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This cost

resulted from the Dodgers paying the Mexican League team for his rights as well
paying him a competitive salary. The negotiation was required by a formal
agreement entered by MLB and the Mexican League that arose from American
players signing in Mexico in the 1940s.
General managers and personnel staff in major league organizations are
pragmatic with roster decisions and candid about signing foreign players.
According to former San Diego Padres General Manager (GM) Joe McIlvaine,
"nobody gets signed out of Mexico simply because they [US teams] don't want to
pay the price tag. 170 "Teams make decisions based upon budgets and if two
players have essentially equal talent and age, the team will go with the cheaper
option. Others would argue that it is in teams’ best interests to sign and field the
best, and most competitive team they can, but that argument has been discredited
by MLB itself. One of the pioneers and leaders in recruiting Latin American
168
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players, Pat Gillick, GM of the Toronto Blue Jays said, "We really don't go into
the Mexican market at all. Mainly because we try to put our dollars where they
count. We think our dollars count more in the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico
and Venezuela. We don't think our dollars are well spent in Mexico." 171
Draft
MLB shifted its historic draft strategy for amateur players. According to
Rob Ruck, “In 1965, 56 percent of all players drafted were high school players,
and about half of those drafted signed contracts. By 2005, only 35 percent of
draftees were high school players, and only a quarter of them signed.” 172 With
less than 10% of players drafted annually coming straight out of high school,
more American players believe that playing college ball for three or four years
will improve their draft position and ultimately result in a contract. To MLB
teams, it is advantageous to draft and sign older, more developed American
players. However, this logic does not apply to Latin American players. The
opposite trend has emerged as teams want to sign players of the youngest possible
legal age. This has led to fraudual Dominicans changing their age or lying about
their identity in an effort to sign for a bigger bonus.
Salary disparity applies to other groups as well, even other Latin American
groups. “The Cuban can come [to the DR] and be thirty years old, and they’ll give
him all the money in the world,” said Dominican trainer Astin Jacobo. 173 Since
high school players drafted and signed are small in numbers, teams have to fill
more roster spots. The Dominican player pool supplies affordable options. For
171
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example, the Oakland Athletics signed 30 Dominicans just between the period of
December 1987 and March 1988. 174
Through the MLB amateur draft, from 1987 to 2008, there were a total of
19,121 players drafted who signed. 175 Two Emory Law professors, Joanna
Shepherd Bailey and George Shepherd, examined the racially discriminatory
effects of the MLB draft and found that the amateur draft was created in the
1960s by the owners primarily because they feared that large bonuses to
untested rookies were threatening the clubs' financial security, and the
expectation that rich teams from big cities would systematically sign better
players than less prosperous teams from smaller markets, thus hurting
competition. 176 Thus, as shown by Table 2 (below),

salaries for players

recruited from North American (American, Canadian and Puerto Rican) proved
to be expensive.
RANGE

AVERAGE

Round 1 Top 5 picks

$6,295,100

5-10

$3,506,560

11-20

$2,644,910

21-42

$1,851,100

Round 2

$1,064,539

Round 3

$652,847
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Round 4

$469,550

Round 5

$351,583

Round 6

$263,250

Round 7

$197,960

Round 8

$171,363

Round 9

$160,023

Round 10

$150,860

Table 2: Average MLB Amateur Draft Signing Bonuses 2015
Source: http://thecomeback.com /theoutsidecorner/2015-articles/thousands-now-millionslater-choice-mlb-draft-pick-must-make.html

Because of the large increase in payroll (including increasing bonuses) as
a percentage of total team revenues, owners had to become more resourceful. In
1977 the payroll accounted for 25% of the average team’s revenue. By 1980, it
had jumped to 39.1% and by 1992 it was over 50%. 177 Economically, baseball
flourished because of new stadiums, attendance, and most importantly television
rights contracts. Still, the owners fight a constant battle against player payroll.
The contentious strikes of 1981 and 1994 illustrated this labor struggle. Free
agency resulted in increased payroll costs and management sought relief. From
1985 to 1987, the owners colluded so that no team bid on any free agents. Under
the leadership of Commissioner Peter Ueberroth, the teams succeeded in
lowering the rate of growth for player salaries. However, each of those three
years, the players filed complaints of collusion and won each time. The owners
would not relinquish control of the labor market easily. One area that could
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possibly counteract salary increases was the hiring of more foreigners. Research
by the National Foundation for American Policy found that:
The percentage of foreign-born players in the major leagues
fluctuated between 2.5 and 4.6 percent from 1900 to 1920, and
dropped below 2 percent in the 1920s and 1930s. It started to rise
after World War II and floated between seven and nine percent
between 1960 and 1985, before increasing dramatically in the
1990s with the influx of foreign players in particular, from the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela. 178
Around 1990 two events further escalated competition for Latin American
players. First, as discussed earlier, was Puerto Rico’s inclusion in the amateur
MLB draft, which made these players as expensive as U.S. born. Second was an
explosion in salary similar to the 1970s after free agency began. Signing bonuses
for first-round draft picks “increased by 40 percent in 1990, 44 percent in 1991,
and 35 percent in 1992.” 179 MLB tried to mitigate this trend by giving teams five
years’ time to hold a player’s exclusive rights. Considering it a revival of the
reserve clause, this policy was challenged by agent Scott Boras and never
implemented. 180 American players received larger contracts and signing bonuses
thanks to agents. However, organizations did not want their Latin American
players to obtain similar representation.
The journalist Gare Joyce interviewed a scout who used the pseudonym
C.G., which stood for contract god. He explained the signing process for
Dominicans circa 1989:
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A scout can offer [the Dominican prospect] a couple thousand
bucks… The scout tells the kid he has so long to decide or else
he’s going to spend the money on another player. Just gives him a
little pressure. The kid has to decide— sign, or wait. His family
doesn’t know anything about ball… The only person the kid can
get advice from is the personal trainer and his commission is fixed
at $300 a head. Of course the kid doesn’t know that. The trainer
will always do the same thing: tell the kid to sign the first thing
that comes along. 181

Some have stated that foreign born players have hurt “American” players’
salaries or opportunities.

However, according to research by the National

Foundation for American Policy:
The increase in foreign-born baseball players does not appear to
have harmed the salaries of native-born players. In fact, since 1990
average major league player salaries more than quadrupled (in
nominal dollars) at the same time the proportion of foreign-born
players in the league more than doubled (from 10 percent to 23
percent today). Average major league player salaries have
increased from $578,930 in 1990 to $2.87 million in 2006. 182

New Foreign Academies
In the 1980s major league teams began to realize the financial implications
of free agency as well as the success of Dominican players and the academy
system. Teams like the Giants, Dodgers and Blue Jays had years of experience
and connections on the island so that other teams believed expansion to different
countries was wise. Andrés Reiner, a special assistant scout, pitched an idea to
different major league teams to create the first academy in Venezuela. After
getting turned down by the Giants and Pirates, the Astros agreed to fund the
project. Up until 1980, there had been a total of 26 Venezuelans who had played
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MLB. 183 Through the establishment of the country’s first academy, 28
Venezuelans reached the major leagues in the 1980s. 184 Though once the richest
country in South America because of its petroleum, Venezuela had a major
economic downturn in the 1980s. This precipitous change led Reiner to assume
that more young men would be interested in professional baseball as a possible
career. According to Sports Illustrated, the reason Venezuela was not producing
as many baseball players as the Dominican Republic or Puerto Rico was “because
of Venezuela’s relatively high standard of living, the hunger that motivated
players in other Latin American countries to use baseball as a way out of poverty
was missing.” 185 The economic disaster in Venezuela changed this picture and
was a bonanza for MLB.
In 1989, the Astros opened the first Venezuelan baseball academy. At that
moment, most Venezuelan signing bonuses were between $5,000 and $10,000. 186
By 2006, half of major league organizations had built academies in Venezuela or
participated in the Venezuelan summer league and all thirty teams had scouts in
the country. 187 As a result of this competition bonus money skyrocketed. Jésus
Montero, a sixteen-year-old Venezuelan catcher, signed with the New York
Yankees for $2 million in 2006. 188 This rapid escalation in bonus salaries for
Venezuelans is similar to the experience of Dominican players.

183

Bjarkman, Diamonds Around the Globe, 385.
Ibid, 385.
185
Mark Bechtel, “Star Gazing the Houston Astros Set Their Sights On Venezuela And Found A
Hotbed Of Talent,” Sports Illustrated, March 12, 1996, p. 46.
186
Milton, Venezuelan Bust, Baseball Boom, 212.
187
Ibid, 214.
188
Ibid, 212.
184

67

Like the Washington Senators in Cuba and later the Blue Jays and
Dodgers in the Dominican Republic, the organization that is first to recruit, sign
and train talent in a new country has a huge advantage: it can control the entire
market of the country. The initial lack of competition from other major league
teams allows teams to save money on player procurement while signing the very
best players available. The Astros of the late 1990s and early 2000s were very
successful. Since they became the Houston Astros in 1965, the team had compiled
a total winning percentage of .493 (over a hundred games under .500). 189 From
1989 when Andres Reiner began the first Venezuelan MLB academy until the end
of the 2005 season when Mr. Reiner retired, the Astros’ winning percentage was
.514 (almost 100 games over .500). 190 Though these gains cannot be attributed
solely to Venezuelan players, it is worth note. The Astros’ Venezuelan academy
developed pitchers Freddy Garcia and Johan Santana and everyday position
players Carlos Guillen, Melvin Mora, Richard Hidalgo, and Bobby Abreu. 191
As is evident, MLB labor relations is correlated to Latin American
recruitment. As Stephen Ross and Michael James Jr. argued, the creation of the
amateur draft in 1965 dismantled the system of North American scouting that had
been around since professional baseball began. Yet they do not examine the
advent of free agency in 1975 increased players’ salaries and a team’s operating
costs. To curb costs, MLB sought players in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela because they were cheaper to sign and develop.
189
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CHAPTER FOUR
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

This chapter examines the era from 2000-2015, a period that saw a huge
increase in the number of Latin American players, especially from the Dominican
Republic, Venezuela, Panama and Cuba. League-wide investment in academy
facilities, training, and signing bonuses for players also increased immensely.
Lastly, this chapter will examine the latest collective bargaining agreement in
2011, why its changes were sought by the owners and how it has affected both
international signing bonuses and amateur draft signing bonuses.
While the period of 2000-2015 witnessed rapid growth and also change in
MLB investment in the Dominican Republic, investment in Venezuela
evaporated. By 2015, there were only four MLB team (Chicago Cubs, Detroit
Tigers, Philadelphia Phillies, Tampa Bay Rays) academies left open in the
country, down from 21 in 2002. 192 Economic, political and social changes in
Venezuela have resulted in this shift by MLB organizations. Former President
192
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Hugo Chavez spearheaded labor reform laws that negatively affected American
baseball and the globalized business of MLB. In terms of security, the Seattle
Mariners and St. Louis Cardinals have had players and staff robbed at gunpoint
and Wilson Ramos, a catcher for the Washington Nationals was even
kidnapped. 193 Diplomatically the relationship between the United States and
Venezuela has further affected MLB’s investments. In 2015, President Nicolas
Maduro made it mandatory for all American visitors to secure a visa to enter the
country, and some have been denied entrance into the country including an Astros
scout. 194 The shortages of goods in Venezuela became so dire that Caracas
newspaper columnist Ignacio Serrano said the Mariners shut down their academy
in 2015 because they couldn’t find enough food for forty players. 195 Though there
remain scouts in the country, the closure of academies is a loss of investment in
the country and may ultimately lead to fewer Venezuelan players being signed
and making it to the major leagues. However, in 2015 a newly elected Congress
began to dismantle some of the Hugo Chavez legacy. If it likewise changes labor
law, MLB academies may return.
The successful academy system developed by two pioneering teams
became the model for all 28 other franchises to tap those countries’ talent pools.
The current buscon and academy training system has as its antecedents Branch
Rickey’s ideas of training and developing talent, the successful business strategy
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of quality out of quantity, and the camps set up by the Blue Jays and later the
Dodgers. Latin Americans’ success in the game is unquestionable and had
historically been cheap to sign. This led to a period of aggressive investment and
recruiting by MLB teams which benefitted players by raising signing bonuses to
levels they had never been before.
Salary Cap
To counteract the high price of signings, MLB created a special salary cap
for Dominican and Venezuelan players in November 2011 after collective
bargaining agreement negotiations. The international salary cap put dollar limits
on the amount teams could spend on players in a given year from those countries.
Depending on how a team did the previous year, “the total allowable signing
limits per team would be between $1.7 million and $4.9 million.” 196 According to
MLB commissioner Rob Manfred, the cap was implemented because “Our
overarching goal was to prevent teams with the largest amount of money from
becoming absolutely dominant in the market for international players, and we
think this levels the playing field.”
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This argument is very similar to the one

owners used for proposing a salary cap during the 1994-1995 labor strike.
MLB negotiated concessions aimed at improving the image of MLB’s
relationship with the Dominican Republic. These include having prospects
register with MLB (to combat age issues), drug testing, and creating a committee
to help international baseball players with job training and education after their
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baseball careers.

198

The international signing bonus pool restricts the “potential

earning power of a whole class of players who lack the protection afforded to all
those above them.” 199 For union members, the more money available, the better.
Arguably, the union, in the last collective bargaining agreement, gave up too
much to the owners in concessions that restrict signing bonuses for certain
international players and players in the Rule 4 amateur draft.
By allowing teams with losing records in the prior season to have a greater
opportunity to sign Latin American players and controlling the cost of the
maximum signing bonus, the new signing bonus pool system is similar to the
amateur draft. It promotes economic and geographic fairness, for the teams, not
the Dominican players. However, one feature of the new signing bonus pool
seems to reward teams for negotiating the cheapest contract possible with a
player. According to authors Arturo Marcano and David Fidler, the new
agreement allows teams to sign an unlimited number of international amateurs for
bonuses of $10,000 or less starting in the 2015/2016 season. 200 According to
Baseball America, a huge factor for how many international players a team can
sign, is the size of their academy. Some teams have large enough training
facilities that they can house and develop multiple Dominican Summer League
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teams. 201 Similar to Branch Rickey’s approach, the more players who have the
opportunity to improve, the better the chances of the team in uncovering a star
player.
As we have seen, signing bonuses for Dominican and Venezuelan players
have increased dramatically over the past thirty years and more so since 2005. In
July 2011, the last international signing period before the new CBA Basic
Agreement, MLB teams spent a combined $47 million on international players.202
The Texas Rangers alone spent $11 million, including a Dominican record, $5
million on an outfielder, Nomar Mazara and another $5 million combined on two
other prospects. 203 In total, seven different players received signing bonuses of $1
million or more. 204 In other words, the Texas Rangers would have gone over the
bonus pool by at least $6.1 million. This signing bonus increase in the 21st century
has been a boon to the players and the private academy system, with buscones
earning much larger percentages. Subsequently it led to the international signing
salary cap, as this increase, if continued in the future, might make it untenable for
teams to invest in the academies as they have been from 2005-2011. Though not
equal to North American players, the recent bonuses are much more in line with
the rest of baseball. According to Baseball America, by 2015, “only a handful of
[Latin American] players sign[ed] each year in the $1 million price range, while
another 200 or so fall into the six-figure bonus territory and another roughly 600
201
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players sign for less than $100,000.” 205 This issue remains unresolved and MLB
will seek to develop an international draft for the new CBA expected by the end
of 2016.

New Academy Construction
As the success of the pioneering Blue Jays and Dodgers became more
apparent, other major league teams sought to build their own academies and
invest in the Dominican Republic. Initially, many academies were simple
facilities. In the 1990s, authors Arturo Marcano and David Fidler wrote about the
deplorable conditions Chicago Cubs prospects had to endure in the Dominican
Republic in their book Stealing Lives. According to accounts, Quiroz and about
two dozen other players lived in a small community called Santana, where they
were assigned to a house with a single toilet and often no running water. Most of
the time, Quiroz said he was given only water and a banana or an orange. 206 This
does not exemplify all player’s experiences or all MLB organizations, but it is an
interesting account that gave the both the Cubs and MLB bad publicity. In the
past fifteen years, teams have increased investment in the Dominican Republic in
part to keep up with their competitors. Rafael Pérez, MLB director of Dominican
operations, explains that, “in the past 10 years 15 academies have been built at an
average cost of $4 million. The more modern and luxurious academies have cost
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$6 million to $8.5 million, a large sum compared to the $785,000 it cost to build
Campo Las Palmas.” 207

Photo 8: Seattle Mariners’ Dominican Academy
Source: http://blogs.seattletimes.com/mariners/2014/02/13/photos-mariners-unveil-new-baseballacademy-in-the-dominican-republic/

In just ten years, 2005-2015, half of all major league teams have built new
academies in the Dominican Republic. This rapid construction and investment
shows how valuable MLB deems the Dominican Republic. Perez says that major
league teams are signing about 450-500 Dominican players annually, because the
teams have the resources in place to develop these players for the future. 208
Almost all of the Dominican players who make it to the major leagues have been
trained in the academies. This differs from other countries such as Japan, Mexico,
and Cuba where players are generally signed at an older age and have played
professional baseball in their countries. A Japanese star like Ichiro Suzuki will not
go to a developmental league; he will go straight to the major league team.
Because of the special relationship between major league baseball and the
Dominican Republic and the investment in facilities that teams have made there,
207
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the island has also become the de facto training ground for other younger, signed
foreign Latin players such as Venezuelans and Panamanians.
Another factor to improve player development in Latin America is the
prospect league. The Dominican Prospect League was created in 2009 to give
prospects more in-game experience. 209 This is a separate league from the
Dominican Summer League which is a minor league affiliate of MLB teams. The
DPL is for amateur players from the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Mexico,
Colombia, Curacao, Cuba, and Panama. 210 Venezuela had its own summer league
for MLB teams’ prospects, but after 19 seasons, it will shut down for 2016
because there are so few teams left in the country. 211 Teams will now shift their
Venezuelan League players to the Dominican Republic. 212
Increase in Cuban Players
During the past fifteen years, an increasing number of Cuban players have
left the island (without permission and without an American visa) to sign with
major league teams. Teams and agents have not been able to do business in Cuba
because of the American embargo and Cuba does not allow its players to sign
with MLB teams and go to the United States. 213 This Cold War policy has left
great Cuban players out of MLB and created a “defector” system for Cuban
players who dare to leave. Some players have braved ocean waters on small boats
209
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to make their way off the island to an MLB team. 214 Other players have defected
in foreign countries, like Mexico, during tournaments while on the Cuban national
team. 215 These players have taken their chance to escape and not return to Cuba,
eventually making their way to the United States after a period of time to establish
residence in Mexico, a neighboring country. This is what brothers Livan and
Orlando Hernandez did in the late 1990s. However, the defection process is a
terrible situation for the players; they risk their safety, the safety of their families
left behind in Cuba, and the likelihood of not being able to return home. This is
weighed against the opportunity for them to play the best competition in the world
and make tens of millions of dollars. Yasiel Puig of the Los Angeles Dodgers
ended up dealing with the Zetas criminal gang in Mexico and paid $250,000 for
his safe passage to the United States. 216 Out of 90 total Cuban defectors, 66 of
them have left since the year 2000. 217 These players signed large contracts,
foregoing some of the “Latin players on the cheap” negotiating that has hampered
other Latin American players. For example, in 2012 Puig signed a seven year,
$42-million-dollar contract with the Dodgers after illegally leaving Cuba,
traveling to Mexico and then illegally crossing the American border. 218 This was
his first professional contract with a major league team, yet it dwarfed Dominican
and Venezuelan contracts. This difference in salaries is not only about talent or
potential, it is because of the collective bargaining agreement. According to the
214
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current CBA, a player who has played in a professional league that is recognized
by MLB and is at least 23 years old is a free agent. This professional experience
means they are no longer an amateur and therefore not held in the international
bonus pool for signing. Because of the Cuban professional leagues, Cuban players
are at a major financial advantage compared to other Latin players when
negotiating their first contract to play for a major league franchise.
Changes abroad politically, economically, and in labor have historically
been driving factors in player production for MLB. First, Cuba’s revolution shut
major league baseball out and made it hard for star players to sign and leave. Up
until 1960, Cuba was the country with the most foreign players in “America’s
pastime.” Puerto Rico became the number one exporter of baseball talent from the
1970s through the 1980s, though the Dominicans were sending more and more
players in the 1980s. Venezuela’s economic downturn in the 1980s led to baseball
becoming a much more attractive and viable economic decision for young men,
which led to establishment of its first academy. Finally, the change to the MLB
first-year amateur draft to include Puerto Rico substantially changed the game.
There, the draft has been blamed for the downfall of the sport on the island;
Puerto Ricans now have to wait until they finish high school to be drafted and
signed, competing head to head with American and Canadian players. Major
league teams now have less incentive to cultivate talent in Puerto Rico because
those players most likely will end up with another team through the draft. 219
Therefore, teams invest their time and money into other countries such as the
219
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Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and most recently Aruba. Whereas, in the
Dominican Republic all 30 teams have their own academy with scouts and
instructors, only “a handful of major league teams have full-time scouts on the
[Puerto Rican] island.” 220 Puerto Rico has had about a 40% decrease in MLB
players since 1989 and the Puerto Rican government even requested an exemption
from the draft which was denied by MLB. 221 In Puerto Rico, there is only one
academy, which is financed by major league baseball, not an individual team.
Established in 2002, the Puerto Rican Baseball Academy and High School
consists of 12 teachers, 16 baseball instructors and about 400 students grades 712. 222 The academy costs MLB about $400,000 a year and through 2012 had
helped over 400 players go to college in the United States as well as having 70
players drafted by MLB. 223 So far though, none of its graduates have made it to
the majors.
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Map 4: MLB Players by Country of Origin 2015
Source: “Opening Day Rosters Feature 230 Players from Outside the U.S.” MLB News 04-062015.

Continuing Problems
The younger the Dominican prospect, the higher the bonus he can be
offered. Accordingly, players’ families and buscones have every incentive to
cheat the system. This market relationship has created problems as players and
buscones falsify ages and/or names. Teams have created this problem because of
how they value Latin American players. For example, the Washington Nationals
in 2006 signed sixteen-year-old Esmailyn Gonzalez to a $1.4 million signing
bonus, but Gonzalez was neither sixteen nor “Esmailyn.” He was actually 21year-old Carlos Alvarez Lugo.” 224 The problem was not an isolated case. After
9/11, the State Department toughened regulations on visas and from 2002-2003,
MLB found 550 cases of identity fraud, 99 percent being Dominican.
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MLB created this problem with its economic strategies, both the MLB and
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Dominicans share blame in the identity fraud problem. However, the Dominicans’
motivation is perfectly understandable. Unlike their counterparts from North
America who are draft-eligible (Americans, Canadians, Puerto Ricans),
Dominican players have a small window with which to earn the most for their
talents. In 2002, the Los Angeles Dodgers were willing to offer a seventeen-yearold right handed pitcher named Jonathan Corporan $930,000 to sign. After hiring
a private investigator to verify his age, the Dodgers discovered Corporan was
actually 21-year-old Reyes Soto. Soto still signed with the Dodgers, but for
$150,000.

226

The difference in signing bonuses is striking, considering most

prospects in the minor leagues are still considered young at 21. Age and identity
fraud are continuing issues for MLB and its teams. Sandy Alderson, a general
manager for multiple teams, was hired in 2010 as an advisor the MLB
commissioner to improve Dominican immigration. He stated then that “I had
personally been burned on a number of occasions by identity fraud. One has to
ask if one is prepared to make the same investment again. If you get burned too
often, you may decide to go elsewhere.” 227
Pay
Dominican bonuses have risen exponentially since the early 1990s. This
wage increase is after a flat period from the 1920s until 1994, during which time
Dominican players’ salaries were the most depressed of any group of MLB
players. Still, even by the early 2000s their salaries paled in comparison to North
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American amateurs. In the 2008 amateur draft, the top ten players’ bonuses
combined came out to $42.8 million. Meanwhile, the top ten international bonuses
of all time paid to players’ total $24.5 million.

228

Both major league teams and

buscones alike point to the infrastructure and development costs of Dominican
players. There are many factors taken into account when considering the total
development cost of a foreign player from the Dominican Republic or Venezuela.
Andres Reiner, scout for the Houston Astros and pioneer in Venezuelan scouting,
laid out his budget and plan for establishing an effective academy. The team
would need scouts, coaches, trainers, a physician, along with a facility to train,
house and feed the young prospects. In 1989, the first year of the program, the
Astros committed $60,000 to the Venezuela project. 229
Some people argue that the international free agent market has hurt
American players’ salaries and opportunities. The 2011 collective bargaining
agreement included some of the biggest changes ever for signing players, both
international and North American. The agreement created a bonus pool for the
amateur draft, meaning that each draft slot had a dollar range attached to it. This
stipulation was marketed as a way to help small market teams compete and sign
players who otherwise would prove too expensive for their budgets. According to
ESPN,
Owners achieved their goal of reining in spending on amateur
players coming to the major leagues. For high school and college
players taken in the June amateur draft, there will be five bands of
penalties, starting with a 75 percent tax on the amount 0-5 percent
over a specified threshold for each team next year, based on its
228
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selection spot. For teams going 5-10 percent over, the tax will rise
to 100 percent and they will lose their next first-round draft pick. If
a team goes more than 15 percent over, it could lose its following
two first-round draft picks. 230

However, the unintended consequence of making the loss of a valuable
first round pick the penalty for overpaying the perceived price of the player in the
amateur draft is that teams have shifted their dollars elsewhere. Since the new
agreement went into effect, no team has gone over the 5% threshold. 231 From
2000 to 2011, amateur “draft spending rose an average of 4.9 percent
annually.” 232 From 2012 to 2014, spending was below the 2011 draft. The owners
saved money on players in the traditional amateur draft, but used those savings on
higher bonuses for international free agents. During that same period, “spending
on big league payroll rose 5 % in 2012, 6.2 % in 2013 and 8.6 % in 2014.”
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There is a bonus pool of money for international players from the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela of $2.9 million. However, the penalty for spending more
than the allotted amount is a tax and a restriction on spending for international
players in the future year. No draft pick will be lost, making it a much more
attractive option for teams trying to sign the best players. “Thirteen teams went
over their pools for 2014-15, resulting in $71.5 million in tax.”234 This
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phenomenon is not lost on agents of college and high school players in the United
States. Agent Scott Boras, who represented Kris Bryant and Carlos Rodon in the
2013 and 2014 drafts, estimates that they lost a combined $15 million because of
the new slotting system. 235
To add more frustration to the current collective bargaining agreement,
Cuban players are neither subject to the amateur bonus pools as are Dominican
and Venezuelan players nor the amateur draft for high school and collegiate
players because they have played more than five years in the Cuban leagues. This
distinction makes them unrestricted free agents, able to negotiate deals more on
par with veteran players. This gives them the advantage of negotiating a large
contract at a relatively young age compared to most players who are drafted or
sign at a young age. Jose Abreu signed a $68 million contract at age 26 in 2013,
without ever having played a game in the minors or major leagues. 236 It was the
largest contract ever for the Chicago White Sox.237 The White Sox did not have to
pay a luxury tax, lose a draft pick, or forfeit bonus money to be spent on other
international players.
As of now, Cuban players who are at least 23 years old and have played in
a Cuban professional league for a minimum of five seasons are exempt from the
international signing guidelines established by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, effectively making them free agents once they are eligible to sign
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with a big league club. 238 Another option is for Cubans to use the wet foot, dry
foot policy of the United States and just come settle here. Enacted because of the
Castro government in Cuba, the policy is defined as “Cuban migrants seeking
passage to the United States who are intercepted at sea ("wet feet") are sent back
to Cuba or to a third country, while those who make it to U.S. soil ("dry feet") are
allowed to remain in the United States.” 239 However, that means they have to
enter the amateur draft. As an example of this, pitcher
Jose Fernandez defected and settled in Florida in 2008, and in 2011
he was drafted by the Marlins. He signed a $2 million signing
bonus. In 2014, the Red Sox signed Cuban star Rusney Castillo to
a $72.5 million deal after he established permanent residence in the
Dominican Republic. 240

To further illustrate the difference in pay for Cuban prospects and other
Latin Americans, one can examine the total money MLB teams spent on
international signings during 2015. For non-Cuban, Latin American players,
teams spent $117.23 million. Whereas, Cuban players were signed for a total of
$83.68 million in 2015.241
In early February 2016 two of Cuba’s top prospects, brothers Lourdes
Gurriel Jr., and Yulieski Gurriel, defected from Cuba following the Caribbean
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Series held in the Dominican Republic. 242 Lourdes is an interesting case example
because he turns 23 in October of 2016. Therefore, it is in his best interest to not
sign with a MLB team until his 23rd birthday, when he becomes an outright free
agent. The difference in salary could be significant, from a few million dollars to
a figure similar to Puig and Jose Abreu, between $40-$70 million. Essentially, the
professional Cuban player can take advantage of a loophole in the current
collective bargaining agreement. The Cuban player’s market value is reflective of
his age (not 16 or 17-year-old prospects like in the Dominican Republic) and
experience (professional Cuban League, national team, etc.). Other countries’
players benefit from similar rules.

Photo 9: Cuban All Stars 2014
Source: http://m.mlb.com/news/article/104397152/evaluating-best-cubans-to-play-in-majorleagues

As alluded to in chapter 2, MLB recruits from other foreign countries
besides Latin America. Since the 1960s, MLB has recruited more players from
Japan. For example, Masahiro Tanaka, a 25-year-old right handed pitcher from
242
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Japan signed with the New York Yankees in January of 2014 as a free agent. The
Yankees paid a $20 million posting fee to Rakuten (Tanaka’s former team in
Japan) under the terms of baseball's posting system with the Nippon Professional
Baseball. 243 The contract for Tanaka was worth $155 million, good for the fifthhighest of any pitcher in history. Besides the posting fee, the Yankees did not
have to surrender draft picks or lose out on bonus money in either the amateur
draft or international market.
A factor for MLB owners’ to consider, in regards to signing bonuses and
salaries, might be the possibility of Latin Americans playing in Japan. The
Japanese team Hiroshima Carp of Japan's Nippon Pro Baseball League has their
own academy in the Dominican Republic. 244 Built in 1990, the academy operates
like MLB academies, signing and developing prospects before bringing them to
the Japanese minor leagues. 245 The Carp even have their own farm team in the
Dominican Summer League. 246 They have developed a handful of players who
have gone on to play in the MLB, but their most successful prospect is Alfonso
Soriano. Hailing from San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic, Soriano did
not receive contract offers from MLB teams at the age of sixteen. According to
his agent Don Nomura, Soriano signed at 16 with the Carp for “a couple hundred
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dollars a month.” 247 After living at the academy during the week for two years
and practicing every day, Soriano went to Japan to play in their minor leagues. 248
After two seasons, there was a salary dispute. 249 His agent Don Nomura “says the
Carp wanted to pay Soriano $40,000 per year when the average foreign player in
the minors was making $220,000.” 250 Because of interest from MLB teams, the
league declared Soriano a free agent and he signed a 4 year $3.1 million contract
in 1998 with the New York Yankees. 251
The current rules regarding salary pools for draft picks and international
signees have created an inequitable situation that richly rewards players from a
few countries playing in recognized pro league, while depressing the wages of
Dominican and Venezuelan signees, as well as players (mostly American) in the
amateur draft.

Work Permits
One impediment to the continued increase in foreign players from Latin
America is the American visa system. Before the 1980s, the number of visas for
foreign players that major league teams requested was not an issue. However, as
more teams invested in academies and signed more players, acquiring enough
visas became troublesome. Author Tim Wendel best describes the situation:
The United States Department of Labor restricts the number of
foreign-born baseball players allowed to enter the country. At the
minor-league level each major league team is allotted an average
247
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of thirty-five temporary work visas per season...Those who reach
the majors are allowed to work in this country under a federal
provision reserved for those with “extraordinary ability in sciences,
arts, education, business, and athletics.” 252

The temporary workers’ visa system greatly diminishes the chances of a
Dominican or Venezuelan to get to the United States to even play in the minor
leagues. Those who are granted visas and invited to a minor league team could be
without a visa the following year. The year to year nature of the visa system
essentially puts these players on one year contracts, at the whim of the
organization.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

Race
Alan Klein and Samuel Regalado wrote extensively about MLB’s
relationship with the Dominican Republic. They both argued that MLB has
exploited Dominican players economically and that this has been done in part as a
continuation of the “Latin players on the cheap” scouting system of old. 253 The
explosion of Dominicans signed by MLB can be traced to one event, the advent of
free agency in 1975. Authors differ on why this trend took hold, but most credit
major league organizations for expanding and improving their scouting efforts.
Some authors also argue that the players’ poverty makes them more determined to
succeed. Most authors also agree that it is cheap for teams to sign and develop
Dominicans and other Latin Americans.
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Adrian Burgos found that Latin American MLB players in the early
twentieth century had to look “white” enough, or “pass” for white. He later
focused on the challenges those first integrated players faced. I agree with Burgos,
Ruck and other authors that discrimination was real. However, race is not the
reason Dominican players are paid less than American players. Any
discrimination or lingering legacies of racism are supplanted now by the business
of baseball. American-born players of any race are paid and treated equally. The
problem for today’s Latin American players is to secure equal wages. While it is
true that the best players earn the highest salaries regardless of race or country of
origin, these men represent an extremely small portion of the professional
baseball pool. Professor Gerald Scully examined race and salary in baseball. He
compared players’ salaries, and examined those salaries based upon race and their
respective batting average and slugging percentages for the previous season
(1985) and their career averages. He found "holding performance constant, black
and white players are paid the same on average." 254 Interestingly enough, Scully
found evidence that in 1968 there were pay differences but he concluded that free
agency had ultimately eliminated race as an economic factor because a free
market let players leave prejudiced owners or teams. 255 Racism and
discrimination are shared experiences for both African American and Latin
American players, but pay differences affect Dominican and Venezuelan players
like no other group in baseball.
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Opportunities
Adrian Burgos clearly lays out the case that Latin American players have a
much more difficult path to reaching the major leagues and that their citizenship
handicaps their ability to earn equal pay. This assertion can be proven with
examples, but the scholarship needs to include the changes made in the last 30
years in signing international players. These changes were implemented in
response to the growing value of international players, specifically from the
Dominican Republic.
Players from the Dominican Republic are at an automatic disadvantage in
the negotiation process with MLB due to their lack of options. Amateur players in
the United States can choose to go to college to try and improve their abilities and
likewise, hopefully increase the size of their potential signing bonus before
entering the amateur draft. Collegiate play is usually not an option for Dominican
players, considering they may have been playing in academies as a teenager for
years or they were signed by a major league team at the age of 17. If a player,
American or Dominican, signs professionally with a team, then he is disqualified
from the MLB amateur draft. This almost guarantees that these Dominican
players have not graduated from high school nor do they have the necessary
academic skills for college. Former major leaguer José Rijo who runs a private
academy in the Dominican Republic, explained that “We know the only way to
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leave the country is by swinging or throwing.”

256

This means that young players

make baseball their full-time job. Lacking an education, Dominican players are
pressured to be first signed by a buscon and then after training, signed by a
professional American team.
Future of Buscones/Academies
Panama could very well be the next country where major league teams
invest to create academies. As of 2015, there are no full time MLB-run academies
in the country. Carlos Levy, international scout for the New York Yankees
explained that he is the only scout for the organization in the country and he
travels around to different cities watching teenagers play, writing scouting reports,
and conducting tryouts. 257 Levy, a Panamanian who played for the Yankees
organization, uses his background and knowledge of the country and culture to
help recruit and sign players. According to him, all thirty organizations each have
one scout in the country. 258 When the players are signed, most are sent first to the
Dominican Republic to play in the Prospect League and train with better
competition before moving on to the minor leagues in the United States. In
Panama, the buscones do not sign players before they are sixteen years old. Even
the best players in the country continue attending school and playing baseball, but
not year round and not in an academy setting that also focuses on diet and weight
training. This difference is advantageous to the Dominicans. Levy explained that
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“in Panama 16 year olds look their age, and in the Dominican the 16 year olds
looks like 20-year-old men with bigger, more developed bodies.” 259
Regardless, Panama has seen a huge rise in players being signed by MLB
since 2000. Panama has a long history with MLB success. Mariano Rivera, the
famous closer for the New York Yankees, is revered in the country like a national
hero and Carlos Lee, a former all-star first baseman for the Houston Astros is now
director of the team Veraguas, a national team of 15-17 year olds. Their success
as players and their investment in Panama after their playing days are done, has
helped further interest. In Carlos Lee’s case, his efforts in coaching are improving
player development at the age group that is preparing to sign with MLB teams. 260
The teams play with wooden bats, to better prepare them for MLB. But another
reason more Panamanians have recently signed involves money. Reynaldo
Rodriguez, representative of the federation of baseball of Panama in the state of
Herrera, states that Panamanians get smaller signing bonuses than Dominican
players. 261 One player that I watched while on vacation in Chitre, Panama, was
Javier Garcia, a pitcher/first baseman who had recently signed with the Miami
Marlins. Garcia, who was 16 when signed in 2015, agreed to a signing bonus of
$65,000 which according to Levy and Rodriguez is about average. 262
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Photo 10: Carlos Levy (R), Robinson Cano (L)
Source: https://twitter.com/carloslevy05

Salary
MLB needs to acknowledge the wage gap and implement a more equal
system. Statistics show that North American players who are selected in the
amateur draft have a significantly higher chance of making it to the major leagues
than Dominican players who are signed. This difference can be attributed to many
factors including exercise regimen, diet, coaching, and game experience. North
Americans generally will have the advantage and general managers and scouting
directors would agree that foreign, Latin American players need more time to
develop before they make it to the major leagues. However, the disparity in
signing bonuses between the two groups of players can put the success rates of
players into better perspective. This harkens back to the days of Joe Cambria and
signing Latin American players on the cheap. It is in a team’s best interest to sign
as many players for $10,000 or less just to see if they develop. With drafted
players, the minimum signing bonus is much higher and teams are more careful
when selecting players. Signing bonuses for foreign, Latin American players
95

were stagnant for decades and then began to rise substantially between 2000 and
2011. Subsequently, MLB instituted the signing bonus pool for international
players beginning in 2012. When one takes into account the Cuban and Japanese
players’ experience with signing bonuses, it becomes evident that the bargaining
agreement unfairly limits Dominican earning potential.
A possible solution to the signing bonus difference would be an
international draft, meaning all international players, regardless of country or age
would be treated equally. Major League Baseball wants to implement an
international draft, but it has faced resistance from Dominicans. In Puerto Rico,
some want to be excluded from the Rule 4 draft, because they blame the draft for
hurting its baseball players. MLB teams would rather sign players from the
Dominican Republic or Venezuela than draft Puerto Ricans. 263 It is expected that
owners will try to implement an international draft for the 2017 season after the
current CBA expires at the end of 2016. 264 Given MLB’s existing Dominican
infrastructure it could hold a televised international draft on the island itself. The
island would receive the benefits of an annual event and also the opportunity to
showcase the island to other future investors. It could also continue to serve as the
Latin American training center.
In most Latin American countries, the development of youngsters via
amateur sports does not exist. Academies are part of an international strategy to
recruit foreigners and widen the baseball audience. In order to be effective as part
263
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of the business model, salaries for imported labor must also take into
consideration the investment. MLB has invested hundreds of millions of dollars
during the past decade to create Latin American training centers in the Dominican
Republic where youngsters basically serve an apprenticeship to learn skills, much
like a plumber or electrician. Learning these skills has nothing to do with the
“love of the game,” nor is it “amateur.”
What some authors ignore is the investment made for native-born players.
Parents subsidize MLB by developing home-grown talent. Most future major
leaguers begin playing T-ball at 5 years of age, then move to Little League, Babe
Ruth, middle school and high school baseball teams. The best players play on
multiple teams, year-round. By the time they reach 18 (draft-age), they have
generally already played 13 years. In addition, it is common to have fitness
coaches, batting coaches, trainers— all paid for by the player’s parents. A high
quality bat now costs $350. Many top brand gloves cost $500, while cleats cost
about $150. Parents pay for travel, equipment, uniforms, and batting cage time.
This could easily total $2,000 per year, a $26,000 investment by draft day, not
including the cost of special diets and medical attention (which could easily triple
this estimate). This sort of subsidy is not possible in Latin America.
Trends
Although Venezuelans recently elected a new congress which is poised to
overturn the past president’s anti-American labor and tax laws, it is doubtful that
the MLB would return immediately. There are 1.5 million youth baseball
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participants in Venezuela, a country of thirty million. 265 As of 2013, in the United
States (a country of over 300 million people) there were 5.3 million young men
aged 7 to 17 who participated in baseball. 266 As laws change, MLB scouts will
return. However, the lack of academies will put a damper on Venezuelan
prospects.
It appears that Mexico is on the cusp of becoming a new hotbed for MLB
recruitment. With the rapid escalation of signing bonuses in the past twelve years
for Dominican, Venezuelan, and Panamanian prospects, the relative cost of
securing Mexican prospects is not as prohibitive. As discussed previously, there
are now multiple academies in Mexico, both privately operated and one owned by
the Mexican League. Recently, the Arizona Diamondbacks announced plans to
expand their relationship with their cross-border neighbors, the Hermosillo
Naranjeros in Sonora. Arizona has hired two former Diamondback players with
connections to the Latin American community. Erubial Durazo, a first baseman
who is from Sonora and Luis Gonzalez, a Cuban-American all-star outfielder,
were named special advisor and special assistant respectively. 267 The plan is to
run baseball clinics in Sonora with Diamondback players and coaches, have
Arizona minor leaguers play for the Naranjeros, and also develop Mexican
players. The long-term goal is to develop an academy. Diamondbacks President
and CEO Derrick Hall stated that, "I've said for many years that what I dream of
265
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for the Diamondbacks is to have a Mexican-born superstar on our roster, but more
importantly, I want one from Sonora." 268 Likewise, Presidents Barack Obama and
Raul Castro agreed to ease baseball recruitment barriers. Increased Cuban
recruitment seems possible in the near future.
Major League Baseball has made tremendous investments and
enhancements to their Latin American operations in response to criticism of past
prospects’ experiences. It behooves MLB to hire buscones to bring them out of
the shadows and to standardize pay for them. MLB needs to address pay
inequalities for players from different countries and come to a common-sense
reform which takes into account academy costs when relevant, but also rewards
players fairly. For example, teams spend a minimum of $5 million on North
American players drafted in the first five rounds (much more if they have a top 5
pick), but are now capped at less than that total for all the Dominican,
Venezuelan, and Panamanian players they sign in a year. MLB should consider
implementing more equal penalties for teams that go over bonus pool caps with
both international players and players in the amateur draft. This issue has to be
taken up by the MLBPA. I agree with baseball writer Mike Axisa, that “Four
years ago [2011], the MLBPA collectively bargained away the earning potential
of amateur players.” 269
History shows that Major League Baseball and its owners will continue
fighting players over salary and continue to acquire talent as cheaply as possible.
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Because of the success of the academy system, in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela, it has become the de facto training program for foreign players. MLB
is expanding recruitment around the world to find talented players who can be
developed in the academies cheaply. Baseball needs to acknowledge the result of
the academy system: significant differences in pay for foreign players depending
on country of origin, and come to a fairer international signing agreement. Since
MLB does not have an incentive to change its draft and signing rules to benefit
both international and North American amateur players, the most likely scenario
is a lawsuit attacking the legality of the Rule 4 amateur draft and the international
signing bonus pool system. As discussed, salaries have risen substantially for
Latin American players in the period from 2000 to 2015 because of increased
competition for their services. The free market solution has limits. The vast
majority of players from the Dominican Republic never will receive million dollar
contracts. Even so the system now in place is an improvement to what prevailed
between 1980 and 1995.
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# of Latin American MLB Players by Country of Origin
COUNTRY

Mexico
Cuba
Dominican Rep.
Puerto Rico
Panama
Colombia
Venezuela
Nicaragua
Honduras
Belize
TOTAL

1900
1950

1950
1960

1960
1970

1970
1980

5
43
0
2
0
1
2
0
0
0
53

7
32
2
14
5
0
4
0
0
0
64

7
35
22
24
13
0
9
0
0
0
110

18
4
37
40
6
1
10
2
0
0
118

1980
1990

1991
2015*

13
68
8
71
64
517
46
125
1
30
1
14
29
287
3
9
1
0
1
0
167 1,121

TOTAL

118
193
642
253
55
17
341
14
1
1
1,635

SOURCES:
Baseball with a Latin Beat; A History of the Latin American Game, Peter C. Bjarkman, Mc
Farland & Co., Inc., Jefferson, N.C., 1994.
*Baseball Reference.com/Bio
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APPENDIX 2: LOCATION OF MLB ACADEMY
FACILITIES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (2015)
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MLB CLUB

TOWNS
S. Pedro Boca Guerra El Toro Villa Najayo
Marcoris Chica
Mella S. Cristobal

Diamond Backs
Cubs
Rockies
White Sox
Twins
Phillies
Mets
Orioles
Reds
Marlins
Yankees
Giants
Rangers
Angels
Blue Jays
Braves
Tigers
Brewers
Dodgers
Mariners
Rays
Astros
Indians
Royals
Pirates
Red Sox
Cardinals
A’s
Padres

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

SOURCE:
MLB.com/DR/academies
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APPENDIX 3: AMERICAN HEMISPHERE
BASEBALL CHRONOLOGY
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CHRONOLOGY
1791 Pittsfield, Massachusetts banned baseball play within 80 yards of the town
meeting hall.*
1823

A Hagerstown, Maryland newspaper mentioned “a game of baseball.”

1845 American Alexander J. Cartwright wrote rules and redesigned the baseball
field for the amateur New York Knickerbockers.
1868 Cubans Nemesio and Ernesto Guillo organized the amateur Havana
Baseball Club in Cuba.
1869

The first American all-professional baseball team organized.

1871 The National Association of Professional Baseball Players (NAPBP)
organized a league including nine teams. Cuban Esteben Belen joined one of the
clubs.
1875

The NAPBP dissolved.

1876 The National League (NL) organized with eight teams from these cities:
Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Hartford, Louisville, New York, Philadelphia and
Saint Louis.
1877 American sailors played an exhibition game for Mexican locals in
Guaymas.
1878

Two professional teams organized in Cuba.

1880 The reserve clause instituted by club owners. Players formed their own
league. Leagues quickly merged.
1887 First sale of American baseball broadcast rights signed. Each team
received $300 in free telegrams in exchange for the right to transmit play-by-play
via the telegraph. Mexico Club amateur baseball team organized.
1889

Amateur baseball organized in Nicaragua.

1890

First American professional player strike.

* NOTE:
Sources differ as to the inception of baseball. Some believe it
evolved from the English game of rounders while others insist that it is a uniquely
American game. Prior to 1845, the field size, shape and even rules varied from
city to city. The MLB Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York cites Abner
Doubleday as the originator. This is disputed by many.
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1891 As a result of the strike, the NL and the American Association merged.
Baseball introduced to the Dominican Republic.
1893 Western League organized. This would later become the American
League.
1898

First amateur game played in Puerto Rico.

1900

American League (AL) organized.

1902 NL, AL and players (NABPL) entered an agreement to end player
poaching, strengthen reserve clause and set a championship between leagues.
Colombian Luis Castro joined the Philadelphia Athletics.
1903

First World Series played. First amateur games played in Colombia.

1907

First Dominican amateur team organized.

1910 American League champions lost six of ten games to Cuban teams. The
movie industry paid $500 for the right to show film highlights of the World
Series.
1911 The movie industry fee was increased to $3,500. Cubans Rafael Almeido
and Armando Marsans joined the Cincinnati Reds.
1912 A third player’s union was formed. There was a brief strike to protest a Ty
Cobb indefinite suspension. He was reinstated. Cuban Miguel Gonzalez joined the
Boston Braves.
1913 Each team received $7,000 per year for five years in exchange for the right
to broadcast play-by-play of games via telegraph.
1914 The Federal League organized. Cuban Adolfo Luque joined the Boston
Braves.
1916

The Federal League ceased to exist.

1922 U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Federal Baseball (Federal League) v.
National League. The court ruled in favor of the NL that baseball was a game, not
a business and therefore wass exempt from the 1890 Sherman (anti-trust) Act.
The World Series was broadcast over the radio for the first time. Revenue was
shared equally by each team (not just those participating) to set a precedent.
1925 Chicago Cubs were the first team to regularly broadcast games over the
radio. No fees were charged since the owner considered this good publicity.
118

Branch Rickey was named the General Manager of the Cardinals. Within a few
years he will established the “farm system.” A Mexican professional league
organized. Mexicans teams soon barnstormed the U.S.A. and the Caribbean.
1926

Mexico hosted the first Central American Games (amateur baseball).

1930 Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala formed
amateur baseball teams to compete in the Central American Games.
1934 The Cardinals won a second World Series in four years, partly due to the
talent from the new farm system.
1937 Venezuela fielded a team to compete in an amateur World Series hosted
by Cuba. The Dominican Republic organized a national tournament.
1938

Puerto Rico organized a professional winter league.

1939 A professional American baseball game was broadcast live over
experimental television for the first time.
1941

An amateur Venezuelan team won the baseball World Cup in Havana.

1946 The Yankees sold rights to locally broadcast games over the television for
$75,000. Venezuela and Panama organized professional winter leagues. The
Guild, an association of major league ballplayers, formed.
1947

Jackie Robinson debuted with the Dodgers.

1948

A Colombian professional league organized.

1950 MLB requested that the U.S. Congress pass a general immunity bill for all
professional sports. Congress took no legislative action.
1954

The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) formed.

1955

All MLB teams sold local television broadcast rights.

1956

Dominican Ozzie Virgil joined MLB.

1957 MLB’s request for general immunity was revisited in the U.S. Congress.
No legislative action was taken.
1965 More than half (56%) of MLB amateur draftees were high school
graduates.
1966

Marvin Miller became the first Executive Director of the MLBPA.
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1968 Miller (MLBPA) negotiated the first collective bargaining agreement. The
most important change involved the appointment of a mutually agreed upon
arbitrator in the event of disagreement. Previously, the Baseball Commissioner
(the owner’s employee) had final word.
1969 MLBPA agreed to pay for Curt Flood’s lawsuit against MLB’s reserve
clause (in effect since 1880).
1972 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld MLB’s anti-trust exemption (and the
reserve clause). The players struck.
1974

A national television contract garnered $72 million.

1975 The MLB arbitrator granted free agency after six years of service, ending
the reserve clause after 95 years. The Blue Jays improved their Dominican
academy.
1976

The average MLB salary was $52,300.

1980

The average MLB salary was $146,000.

1981

MLB players struck.

1984

The Dominican Republic enacted law to set a minimum signing age of 17.

1985

MLB players went on strike.

1987

The Dodgers inaugurated their new Dominican academy.

1989

The first (of 21) academy built in Venezuela.

1990

MLB owners locked out players for 32 days.

1991

The average MLB salary was $891,888.

1994

MLB players struck. The World Series was canceled.

2001

The average MLB salary was $2.26 million.

2002 Television broadcast rights earned $24 million to each team. Twenty-one
academies operated in Venezuela.
2005 About one third (35%) of MLB amateur draftees were high school
graduates. More than one quarter (26%) of all MLB players were Hispanic.
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2007

The number of Hispanic MLB players increased to 29%.

2010 The number of Venezuelan academies decreased to six while the number
of Dominican academies increased to 30.
2011 The average MLB salary was $3.3 million. A special salary cap was
instituted by MLB owners for Dominican and Venezuelan players.
2014

Annual MLB revenue increased to a record $8 billion.

2015

The number of Venezuelan academies decreased to 3.
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